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There are three essays in this dissertation. First essay provides empirical evidence 
that agency cost is a significant determinant of firms’ cash holdings. We reach the 
following three conclusions: (i) firms’ cash holdings increase in the strength of investor 
protection, (ii) excess cash holdings are valued more with better investor protection, and 
(iii) cross-listed firms that improve investor protection through “bonding” hold relatively 
more cash than non-cross-listed firms. In the second essay, we find that consistent with 
agency theory and free cash flow hypothesis, the effect of the combination of excess cash 
and strong governance on firm valuation varies by firms’ investment opportunities and 
acquisitions. We find a value-added effect of excess cash for firms with strong 
governance when there is low level of free cash flow and acquisitions. On the contrary, 
for firms with high free cash flow that engage in acquisitions, the combination of excess 
cash and governance does not add value. Further, poor investment opportunities are 
value-destroying, although excess cash adds value for firms with stronger governance 
regardless of the level capital expenditure. In the third essay, we find that there is a 
uniform co-movement liquidity beyond the BBO as measured by strings. The liquidity 
beyond the BBO is ubiquitously invariant across trading days, while remarkably variant 
across securities. The variations of depth and the variations of immediacy needed for the 
common movement of liquidity beyond BBO, however for the first time, are found to be 
iv 
 
moderate and large respectively across trading days. These aspects of liquidity beyond 
the BBO are positively correlated with return volatility of strings.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
There are three essays in this dissertation. First essay provides empirical evidence 
that agency cost is a significant determinant of firms’ cash holdings. The second essay 
shows that the effect of the combination of excess cash and governance on firm valuation 
varies by firms’ growth potential and the scale of free cash flow and acquisitions. The 
third essay investigates the existence and extent of liquidity beyond the best bids and best 
offers.  
In the first essay, we examine (i) whether the level of firms’ cash holdings differ 
depending on the strength of investor protection, (ii) whether excess cash holdings are 
valued more with better investor protection, and (iii) whether cross-listed firms that 
improve investor protection through “bonding” hold relatively more cash than non-cross-
listed firms.  We analyze 1,405 ADR firms and their corresponding matched firms from 
39 different countries and document that ADR firms have significantly higher cash 
holdings relative to their non-cross-listed peers, especially in recent years. The increase in 
cash holdings is much higher for emerging market firms because of their transition from 
particularly poor home country investor protection and accounting standards before cross 
listing to much higher standards after cross listing. In addition, firms with level III ADR 
listing, which represents the strongest investor protection, have higher cash holdings 
relative to other types of ADR firms.  
In the second essay, we find that, consistent with agency theory and free cash 
flow hypothesis, the effect of the combination of excess cash and strong governance on 
firm valuation varies by firms’ investment opportunities and acquisitions. We find a 
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value-added effect of excess cash for firms with strong governance when there is low free 
cash flow and acquisitions. On the contrary, when high free cash flow is coupled with 
engaging in acquisitions, the combination of excess cash and governance does not add 
value for well-governed firms and destroys value for poorly-governed firms. Further, 
poor investment opportunities decrease firm value, although excess cash adds value for 
firms with strong governance regardless of the level capital expenditure.  
In the third essay, we investigate the existence and the extent of liquidity beyond 
the best bid and offer (BBO) using Tokyo Security Exchange tick-by-tick daily trading 
data. We find that there is a uniform co-movement liquidity beyond the BBO as 
measured by strings. Strings are a series of trades each of which is at a price that is 
inferior to or equal to the price of the previous trade in the series. The liquidity beyond 
the BBO is ubiquitously invariant across trading days, while remarkably variant across 
securities. The variations of depth and the variations of immediacy needed for the 
common movement of liquidity beyond BBO, however for the first time, are found to be 
moderate and large respectively across trading days. These aspects of liquidity beyond 
the BBO are positively correlated with return volatility of strings. Moreover, we are also 
the first to show that the information content is a significant determinant of the return for 
trades beyond BBO by using the LOB slope, the beginning price, the beginning volume, 
the beginning spread, and the duration of strings as proxies for the measure of the 










The proverb “Cash is King” has attained renewed clout as corporate America's 
cash holdings have hit their highest level in half a century. Recent articles in the popular 
business press suggest that nonfinancial companies in the U.S. increased their holdings of 
cash and other liquid assets in 2011 to a record $2 trillion, which represents 7.1% of the 
companies' total assets. Our analysis indicates that the proportionate cash ratio is even 
higher for international firms.  According to Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order 
theory, retained cash holdings provide a quick way to fund profitable expansion 
opportunities without resorting to costly external financing, thus reducing the marginal 
cost of liquid asset shortage. In this sense, cash is a desirable asset. On the negative side, 
Jensen (1986) posits that the deployment of cash is central to the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders.  Managers have strong incentives to build large piles of cash 
due to the relative ease with which cash can be expropriated or used for non-value-
maximizing corporate activities for their own private benefit.  Cash is also viewed as an 
idle and unproductive asset earning a minimal rate of return. This perspective implies that 
holding less cash is desirable due to its relatively high marginal cost compared to more 
productive assets. This trade-off between the positive and negative effects of cash has 
important implications for the optimal level of cash reserves that firms actually maintain.   
In this study, we show that a reduction in agency costs obtained through strong 
investor protection plays a significant role in a firm’s decision of how much cash to hold. 
Consistent with agency theory explanations of cash holdings, we show that better 
4 
 
shareholder protection and better accounting standards are associated with higher levels 
of cash holdings. Moreover, we show that the positive association between investor 
protection and cash varies over and our results in the recent years depart significantly 
from our results in the prior years and from the prior literature (e.g., Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith, & Servaes, 2003). Specifically, after 1998 the relation between shareholder 
protection and cash holdings strengthens. We attribute this finding to changing investor 
perceptions on the efficiency of firms’ use of cash. Investors value excess cash 
significantly more for firms with better investor protection after 1998.  Because liquid 
assets are the most vulnerable to misappropriation, we conjecture that the period 
coinciding with the Asian, Russian, and Latin American financial crises of 1997-1998 
caused investors to scrutinize more closely managerial behavior and infer productivity of 
cash based on observable country and firm-level attributes. Thus, investors assign higher 
valuations to firms that are less likely to misuse cash due to better shareholder protection.   
Since investors value cash more highly in strong investor protection environments, 
how can managers reliably commit to subject themselves to increase investor protection? 
A popular answer to the question is in the “bonding hypothesis” proposed by Coffee 
(2002) and Hope, Kang, and Zang (2007) which predicts that firms cross listed on a U.S. 
stock exchange provide better investor protection than their domestic peers in their 
respective home markets.1 This hypothesis posits that heightened scrutiny by investors, 
analysts, traders, exchanges, the SEC, and government enforcement agencies effectively 
                                                            
 
        1 Coffee (2002) defines "bonding" as a term of art in modern institutional law and economics. It refers 
to the costs or liabilities that an agent or entrepreneur will incur to credibly signal and assure investors that 
it will perform as promised, thereby enabling it to market its securities at a higher price. 
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restrain managers of foreign firms cross listed in the U.S. markets from expropriating 
minority shareholders. Therefore, bonding leads to a significant reduction in agency costs. 
Recent empirical research (e.g., Frésard and Salva, 2010) shows that firms enjoy higher 
valuation of cash and other liquid assets by shareholders when they have better 
governance and lower agency costs. Given the prediction about the effects of bonding on 
mitigating agency conflicts, we hypothesize that the improved governance associated 
with cross listing enables firms to retain a higher level of cash holdings for the purpose of 
increasing shareholders’ wealth through easier exploitation of future business 
opportunities. With better investor protection in the U.S. markets, managers are less 
inclined to misappropriate cash. Therefore, investors are less likely to discount the cash 
holdings of these firms.  Thus, all else equal we expect that cross-listed firms will hold 
more cash than firms that do not cross list in the U.S.2  
We focus our analysis on the period from 1992 to 2009 during which 95% of the 
currently cross-listed firms entered the U.S. exchanges. We test the hypothesis that 
investor protection is a significant determinant of corporate cash holdings by studying the 
level of cash holdings of 1,405 ADR firms in our final merged sample from 39 countries 
with varying levels of shareholder protection and accounting standards. We also form a 
matched control sample of non-cross-listed domestic firms that have similar firm 
characteristics as the cross-listed firms. We find that the average cash holding, which is 
defined as cash plus equivalents divided by firm’s net assets, is higher for cross-listed 
                                                            
 
       2 While cross-listed firms have greater access to external finance and thus should have less need to hold 
cash, we assume the governance explanation dominates the effects of ease of access to external capital. 
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firms than for their matched counterparts listed only in the domestic markets. For cross-
listed firms themselves, the ratio is higher after cross listing than before. In our 
robustness tests, following Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) we use the ratio of cash 
to sales as an alternative measure of liquidity and find that this ratio also increases with 
the degree of shareholder protection and cross listing.   
The bonding effect of cross listing is more pronounced for firms from emerging 
markets which may previously suffer from inferior home country investor protection 
compared to that in developed markets. We observe a substantially higher increase in 
cash holdings of emerging market firms relative to cross-listed firms from the developed 
markets or matched samples of non-cross-listed home market firms. We also interact a 
home market investor protection variable with cross listing in the U.S. market to 
understand these differential impacts on cash holdings. Whereas firms from home 
markets with poor investor protection initially hold a lower level of cash than firms from 
home markets with better investor protection, firms in the former category also 
experience a much higher increase in the level of their cash holdings after cross listing. 
Moreover, cross-listed level III ADR firms hold more cash than level I, level II or 
restricted ADR firms. Because level III ADRs require the strictest compliance with U.S. 
laws and regulations and, therefore, represent the highest level of shareholder protection 
and information disclosure, shareholders discount the cash holdings of these firms less 
than the lower level ADR listings. The effect of level III ADR cross listing is robust to 
the removal of sample firm-years that may have higher cash holdings due to the effects of 
new financing. In summary, the increase in the level of cash holdings depends on the 
degree of improvement in investor protection. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to 
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show that an improvement in investor protection and reduction in agency costs resulting 
from cross listing enables firms to hold more cash.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
literature review focusing on theories of excess cash valuation and other potential 
determinants of a firm’s cash holdings. We then formulate testable hypotheses from this 
literature. We describe our data and the variables of our final sample in Section 3. We 





As agents of shareholders, corporate managers often have conflicts of interests 
dubbed as agency problems by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Corporate managers have a 
strong incentive to hoard cash, either to increase private benefits or to increase their 
power via greater control of resources. Large cash holdings enable managers to over-
invest in projects, even if some of those projects have a negative NPV, because it is in the 
managers’ best interests to let the firm grow into a corporate empire (Jung, Kim, & Stulz, 
1996). On the other hand, shareholders who are concerned about managers’ inclinations 
to extract excessive private benefits of control, , aim at a lower level of cash holdings 
(Stulz, 1990). They prefer a payback of the return on their investment in the form of 
dividends or a stock repurchase instead of leaving the cash to the managers’ discretion.  
Thus, a testable implication of the agency cost model on the effect of information 
asymmetries between shareholders and managers, is that the level of cash holdings 
should optimally be kept low if the conflicts of interest between these two parties are 
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high. With more severe conflicts, investors discount cash holdings more heavily. Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007) document the relation between corporate governance and the 
relative valuation of a firm’s cash holdings in the stock market, and provide empirical 
evidence that the value of cash is substantially less if corporate governance is poor. 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) and Frésard and Salva (2010) show that the 
stock market discounts the value of cash held by poorly governed firms by 10% to 60% 
compared to well-governed matching firms in countries with better investor protection.  
Strong investor protection makes it very costly for managers to pursue their 
conflicting personal interests over shareholders’ interests, thus mitigating agency 
problems. For example, Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003), Hope, Kang, and Zang (2007), 
and Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva (2006) show that high quality accounting disclosures 
increase firm valuation by limiting the flexibility that the managers have for potentially 
abusing corporate assets. Drobetz, Grüninger, and Hirschvogl (2010) find that the value 
of corporate cash holdings is lower in states with a higher degree of information 
asymmetry, which is inversely related to the degree of investor protection. As a result, we 
posit that shareholder protection and accounting standards are significant predictive 
factors in determining the level of a firm’s cash holdings. None of the papers cited above 
examine the effects of a valuation premium due to better investor protection on the actual 
level of cash holdings of the firm. 
With growing investor sophistication, we expect time series variations in the 
importance of investor protection. For example, Mitton (2002), Johnson, Boone, Breach, 
and Friedman (2000), Stiglitz (1998), and Rajan and Zingales (1998) conclude that the 
emerging market crises in 1997-98 highlighted the importance of good corporate 
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governance for firms’ operating performances and stock market returns. Firsthand 
experience from emerging stock market losses,  and investor education from the 
academic analysis of crises may prompt equity market participants to pay more serious 
attention to investor protection issues after 1997-98. Mitton (2002) specifically states that 
“the actions of firms and institutions following the crisis have demonstrated at least a 
recognition of the role of weak governance in the crisis and of the need to change 
governance practices.” We explicitly incorporate this time series variation in our first 
hypothesis and separately analyze the periods before and after the international crises of 
1997-98 in our empirical tests. After the crises, corporations in countries with poor 
investor protection took action to relieve investors’ concerns and to solve agency issues 
through various means such as cross listing.  
Bonding hypothesis 
 
Doidge, Karoyli, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2009) and Hope, Kang, and Zang (2007) 
propose cross listing as an effective mechanism for managers to signal their commitment 
to the best practices in shareholder protection and accounting and disclosure standards, 
with adverse consequences for violating their commitment. They suggest that firms cross 
listed on U.S. stock exchanges have unique governance benefits relative to firms cross 
listed in London (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2009) and are better governed than their 
domestic peers, because they are subject to more stringent U.S. laws and regulations 
designed to protect the interests of minority shareholders.  For example, firms are subject 
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Sarbanes Oxley Act, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) reporting requirements, and stricter enforcement of investor 
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protections laws. Each of these serves to effectively limit managers’ ability to manipulate 
reported earnings or misappropriate corporate resources for their private benefits. 
Additionally, U.S. listed firms must adhere to the disclosure requirements set out by 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS3) in the U.S. markets, thereby largely reducing the 
information asymmetry between managers and investors. The specific predictions of the 
bonding hypothesis according to Lel and Miller (2008) are as follows: (1) investors 
expect cross-listed firms to have better corporate governance than non-cross-listed firms, 
(2) the improvement in corporate governance of firms from weaker shareholder 
protection regimes (e.g., emerging markets) is greater than those from stronger 
shareholder protection regimes (e.g., developed markets), and (3) the improvement in 
corporate governance of firms that are subject to the most stringent U.S. rules through a 
level III ADR listing is greater than those with lower levels of listing. The enforcement 
mechanism driving these predictions is apparent in their empirical work, which shows 
that poorly performing CEOs of cross-listed firms are more likely to be terminated than 
poorly performing CEOs in non-cross-listed firms. Similarly, Khanna, Palepu, and 
Srinivasan (2004) find that cross listing is associated with a higher level of accounting 
disclosure and corporate transparency. Additionally, Fernandes, Lel, and Miller (2010) 
find that the requirement to adhere to U.S securities regulations has a positive impact on 
shareholder valuation, particularly for firms from home country with weak governance. 
                                                            
 
        3 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been in the process of developing and 
executing a Work Plan to incorporate IFRS into the U.S. financial reporting system since early 2010.  
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Cross listing also exposes a firm to closer scrutiny by expert analysts who can more 
accurately forecast the firm’s future prospects.  Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) find that 
cross-listed firms experience greater analyst coverage and higher valuation. Frésard and 
Salva (2010) show that the value that investors attach to excess cash holdings is 
substantially larger for firms cross listed in the U.S. stock market relative to their 
domestic peers, due to stronger enforcement of U.S. legal rules and stricter disclosure 
requirements in the U.S. stock market. While  none of these papers focus explicitly on the 
impact of enhanced investor protection on the level of firms’ cash holdings, our analyses 
extend the literature on the relation between bonding through U.S. cross listing and the 
amount of cash held.  
Determinants of the optimal level of cash holdings 
 
Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) posit that firms determine the optimal level of 
cash and other liquid assets by evaluating a tradeoff between the low return earned on 
liquid assets compared to the benefit of minimizing costly external financing. Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (hereafter OPSW, 1999) use their transaction cost 
model of cash holdings for the U.S. market to identify a number of important 
idiosyncratic determinants of cash holdings. Specifically, cash holdings increase with 
cash flow volatility (industry sigma), the market-to-book ratio, R&D expenditure, and 
operational expenditure. Cash holdings decrease with firm size due to economies of scale 
and the relative ease of obtaining external financing as the firm grows. A major 
difference between OPSW (1999) and our study is that we provide empirical evidence 
that investor protection is an important determinant of corporate cash holdings. Our study 
12 
 
is the first to draw a positive link between cash holding levels and the value of cash 
holdings due to a reduction in agency costs. Furthermore, ours is also the first study to 
document increases in cash holdings when a firm cross lists in the United States.     
Another important control variable that has received scarce attention in the 
corporate finance literature is the degree of inflation in the economy. Economists have 
demonstrated that inflation affects asset allocation, wealth, and expenditures (Ungern-
Sternberg, 1981). As such, we expect that similar behavior exists among firms. In 
addition to the idiosyncratic determinants identified by OPSW (1999), we show that 
inflation also significantly affects the optimal level of corporate cash holdings.  
Hypotheses 
 
The discussion presented above leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis I: Investor protection is a significant determinant of firms’ cash holdings in 
that: (a) The quality of investor protection and accounting standards, through their role 
in reducing agency costs, significantly affect firms’ cash holdings. (b) Investors value 
excess cash more for firms with stronger investor protection, particularly after the onset 
of the emerging market crises of the late 1990s.  
Since a firm can improve its investor protection with its decision to cross list in 
the U.S. markets (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2004; Hope, Kang, & Zang, 2007), we 
hypothesize that cross-listed firms have a higher level of cash holdings because such 
bonding mitigates the adverse selection problem for investors. Figure 1 demonstrates the 
trade-off between the costs (opportunity costs and agency costs) and benefits (avoidance 
of shortages) of holding cash. Suppose the optimal level of cash holdings without agency 
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costs is at point a. With agency costs, the total cost of holding cash shifts upward and 
reduces the optimal level of cash holdings to point b in poor investor protection 
environments. Resolution of agency problems by cross listing in the U.S. markets allows 
the firm to increase its cash holdings back to the optimal level at point a because cross 
listing serves as an effective bonding mechanism for investors who now trust that the 
firm will use cash effectively.  
Hypothesis II: Firms can subject themselves to improved investor protection by cross 
listing in developed markets such as the U.S.. Thus, this bonding hypothesis extends the 
predictions of the first hypothesis and states that cross listing increases cash holdings as 
a result of improved shareholder protection, higher accounting standards, and less 
information asymmetry between managers and investors.  
The magnitude of the benefits of cross listing depends on the difference between 
the degree of investor protection before cross listing and after cross listing. Factors such 
as the listing level affect the degree of investor protection after cross listing whereas the 
environment in the home country affects the degree of investor protection before cross 
listing. Among the various types of ADRs4, level III ADRs need to adhere to the most 
stringent rules and requirements. Hence, a level III ADR listing should improve investor 
protection more than a level II or level I ADR listing.  
                                                            
 
       4 To qualify for having a sponsored level I ADR, the only requirements are that a company’s shares 
must be traded on at least one non-U.S. exchange and the firm must post an annual report in English on its 
web site, but the company is not required to meet U.S. accounting standards. In addition there are two types 
of unlisted restricted ADRs with minimal U.S. requirements: a) SEC Rule 144(a) private placements ADRs 
and Regulation S foreign listed ADRs. To qualify for a Level II sponsored ADR, a firm must register with 
the SEC and comply with U.S. accounting standards. Firms wishing to raise capital in the U.S. from 




The difference also depends on the firm’s home market financial development. 
Firms from countries with very poor investor protection benefit more from cross listing, 
than firms from an already advanced country (Hail and Leuz, 2009, and Doidge, Karolyi, 
& Stulz, 2004). 
Hypothesis III: The magnitude of cross listing on cash holdings depends on the difference 
between the ending value of investor protection in the U.S. markets and the beginning 
value of investor protection in the home market: (a) Since a level III ADR cross listing 
offers the highest degree of investor protection, firms listing as level III ADRs are 
expected to hold more cash relative to other types of ADR firms. (b) The impact of cross 
listing on cash holdings is greater for firms from weaker investor protection 
environments such as those from emerging markets than for firms from countries where 
investor protection is already strong.  
We test these hypotheses in the following sections using panel data regressions and 
matched control sample analysis. Throughout our analysis, we control for several 
alternative reasons that may result in higher cash holdings such as growth opportunities 
(Hail and Leuz, 2009) and access to external financing. As mentioned earlier, cross-listed 
firms have greater access to outside sources of capital which might mitigate their need for 
cash relative to non-cross-listed firms. Thus, to be economically and statistically 
significant, the agency and bonding effects have to offset more than the effects of the 
relative ease of obtaining external financing. In this sense, the results we report are 
conservative estimates of the effects of cross listing. 




We obtain our data from the following major sources: DataStream, World Bank, 
J.P. Morgan, and academic articles such as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanez, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (LLSV hereafter, 1997, 1998) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (KKM 
hereafter, 2010). For our primary dependent variable, we measure cash holdings as the 
ratio of cash and equivalents (DataStream item 02001: cash and short term investments) 
to net assets. Net assets are computed as total assets (DataStream item 02999) minus cash 
and equivalents. For an alternative measure of cash holdings, we divide cash and 
equivalents by sales (DataStream item 01001). 
Corporate governance studies such as Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2009) show that countries’ characteristics are major forces in shaping corporate 
governance. Thus, we examine two country-level facets of investor protection quality, 
which include the level of shareholder protection and the degree of accounting disclosure. 
We use two alternative definitions of an Investor Protection Index (IPI) and also compare 
our results with a couple of other IPI measures used in prior literature. For our first 
measure, KKM (2010) provide a time series of six governance indices relating to voice 
and accountability, political stability and absence of violence or terrorism, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption for 213 countries 
from 1996-2010. We construct the KKM-IPI as the sum of these six country level 
investor protection indicators over our study period. We compute the second investor 
protection measure LLSV2-IPI, following Berkman and Nguyen (2010) by dividing the 
product of rule-of-law index (LLSV, 1997) and anti-director rights index (LLSV, 1998) 
by 10.  Next, we obtain the accounting disclosure standard ratings from LLSV (1998) 
where the United States has a score of 71 and Sweden the highest score of 83. From 
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DataStream, we also collect accounting and financial ratios and other control variables 
that explain the level of the firms’ cash holdings according to the transaction cost model 
of OPSW (1999). For example, we measure firm size as the natural log of the total assets 
in 2009 dollars based on the CPI. We define leverage as the ratio of total debt to net 
assets. Next, we create a dividend indicator variable, which is set to 1 if the firm paid out 
dividends in the given year, and 0 otherwise. Another important determinant of observed 
cash holdings is the firms’ operating cash flow. We follow OPSW (1999) and begin with 
earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation, and amortization. From this, we deduct 
only the cash outflows, i.e., interest, taxes, and common dividends, to arrive at firms’ 
operating cash flow. Also following OPSW (1999) and Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and 
Servaes (2003), we include R&D expenditure as a proxy for information asymmetry, 
which can be a measure of agency costs. We compute it as a ratio of R&D expense to 
sales and set to 0 in the years when the firm does not incur any R&D expenses. We 
control for growth prospects of the firm by including the M/B ratio (market value of 
equity divided by book value of equity).  Lastly, following Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) 
and the Appendix in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), we measure volatility of cash flow 
by computing the rolling average of the cash flows for each firm during the prior 10 years 
and then obtaining the standard deviation of the averaged cash flow for all the firms in a 
given industry sector. We obtain the types of ADR (Level I, Level II, Level III, 144A, or 
restricted program) from the J.P. Morgan website (www.adr.com) for 2,087 cross-listed 
firms included in their list. From these, 321 firms operating in the financial services 
industry such as banks, insurance and real estate firms, and utility firms are removed 
according to the common practice in corporate finance research. To keep an ADR in the 
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sample, we require that it is from one of the countries that have LLSV’s accounting 
standard rating available. Our sample period ranges from 1992 to 2009.5  
For each of these ADR-issuing firms, we find a matching non-ADR-issuing 
domestic firm from the same country of origin without replacement based on three 
additional stock attributes: industry sector, market value, and market-to-book ratio. 
Following Huang and Stoll (1996), we first require the industry code to be the same for 
cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms and then minimize the composite matching score 
(CMS) as shown in equation (1):
 
 
∑ / /2 	      (1) 
where Xi represents one of the remaining two stock attributes of market value, 
and market-to-book ratio; the superscripts of C and D represent the cross-listed firm and 
the domestic firm respectively.  In our final sample, there are 1,405 ADR firms and their 




       5 In 1973, there were a total of 27 foreign firms cross-listed as American Depository Receipts (ADR) in 
the U.S. markets. In 1992, which is the starting point of our sample, there are 99 cross-listed ADRs and at 
the end of our sample period in 2009 there are 2,187 active ADRs.  
 
       6 The t-test shows that there is no statistically significant difference in the market-to-book ratio between 
the ADR firms and matched non-ADR firms. In addition, the t-test indicates that ADR firms’ market values 
are larger than the matched non-ADR firms. However, according to OPSW (1999), firm size is inversely 
related to the level of cash holdings. Thus, cross-listed firms, which are typically larger, are expected to 
hold less cash relative to smaller sized firms due to the size effects. But cross-listed hold more cash due to 
bonding effects. In this sense, the ‘bonding increases cash holding’ results we report are conservative 
estimates of the effects of cross-listing. Our results in the multivariate section show that firm size is 
negatively related to the level of cash holdings, consistent with OPSW (1999). More importantly, the effect 
of cross-listing survives the inclusion of firm size both as a matching criterion and a control variable in the 








Table 1 Panel A depicts means, standard deviations, and medians of key firm 
specific variables for our final sample. The average net cash ratio across all firms is 23%. 
This number is close to the range reported in the previous literature for the U.S. firms, 
e.g., 17% in OPSW (1999) and 22% in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).7 We winsorize 
the net cash ratio at its 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate the effect of any outliers. Panel 
B shows the distribution of firms by country of origin. The United Kingdom has a total of 
5,120 firm-year observations from 364 firms included in the final sample, among which 
182 firms are cross listed firms. The United Kingdom is followed by Japan, which has 
362 total firms and 182 cross-listed firms. At the lower end of the range is Jordan with 6 
firms or 57 firm-year observations. Firms from Switzerland have the highest level of cash 
holdings, while those from Portugal and Colombia have some of the lowest cash holdings 
levels. The KKM-IPI composite index can theoretically range from -15 for the poorest 
investor protection to +15 for the best investor protection. Finland has the highest KKM-
IPI score of 11.35 and is followed by Denmark with a score of 11.04. Venezuela has the 
lowest KKM-IPI score of -5.27. Although we do not list the U.S. in Table 2 because it is 
not  the country of origin for any ADR issuers, the U.S scores the highest in the LLSV2-
IPI with a full score of 5 and the United Kingdom scores the second highest with a score 
                                                            
 
       7 Larger firms hold less cash. Firms in the largest quartile of total assets hold an average of 10% of their 
net assets in cash in our sample. 
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of 4.3. The relative strength of KKM-IPI over LLSV-IPI used in prior literature is also 
apparent from the values for countries like Germany and Belgium. KKM-IPI indicates a 
better than average protection in these countries which is more likely the case than the 
below average investor protection suggested by LLSV-IPI for these countries.8 In terms 
of accounting disclosure standards ranking, Sweden ranks at the top with a score of 83, 
while Indonesia ranks at the bottom with a score of 4.2. 
In Figure 2, we plot the cash/net asset ratio five years prior to the year of cross 
listing (gray bar) and five years after cross listing (black bar) for all cross-listed firms in 
Panel A. For comparison we also plot the ratio for the matched non-cross-listed control 
firms. The matched control firms do not actually cross list but we create hypothetical 
before and after periods for the matched firms using the cross listing date of the 
corresponding ADR sample firms.  As shown in the figure, cross-listed firms have a 
substantially larger increase in cash holdings after cross listing in the United States 
compared to the non-cross-listed firms. In Panel B of Figure 2, we plot the cash holdings 
before and after cross listing separately for developed market firms and emerging market 
firms. Firms from the emerging markets have a higher increase in cash holdings after 
cross listing than the increase experienced by their developed markets counterparts.  
                                                            
 
       8 For example, the LLSV2-IPI for Belgium is 0, while the corresponding KKM-IPI is 8.02. According 
to LLSV, Germany’s investor protection index oddly is 0.9, which is lower than 11 out of the 18 emerging 
markets. Thus, KKM-IPI that we use appears to be a better representation of investor protection for our 




Multivariate regression analysis 
 
We continue to examine the relation between cash holdings and investor 
protection in multivariate regression analysis where we control for inflation rates and a 
number of other determinants of cash holdings suggested by OPSW (1999). We also 
control for cross-sectional systemic variations in cash holding policies across countries 
over time both by estimating fixed effects models and, separately, by estimating the 
regression models using two-way clustered standard errors (Petersen, 2009) without fixed 
effects. 
 
Investor protection variables as determinants of cash holdings 
 
We use four measures to evaluate each country’s investor protection quality and 
its effect on reducing agency costs and enhancing cash holdings. The first two measures 
are the Investor Protection Indexes – KKM-IPI and LLSV2-IPI – as defined in the data 
section. In Panel A of Table 2 we show the results for the entire sample period. In column 
(1) the KKM-IPI has a statistically significant positive coefficient of 0.047 where the 
logged net cash ratio is the dependent variable. In column (2) The LLSV2-IPI has a 
statistically significant positive coefficient of 0.10. Thus, firms operating in countries 
with stronger shareholder protection appear to hold more cash, consistent with the 
prevailing U.S evidence (Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008). The next measure of 
investor protection in our study is the quality of accounting disclosure standards in the 
firms’ home country, as reported by LLSV (1998). The statistically significant and 
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positive coefficient of 0.018 in column (3) suggests that the higher the accounting 
standards, the greater the amount of cash held. The findings suggest that various aspects 
of investor protection appear to play a significant role in alleviating agency problems. 
With improved investor protection, firms are able to hold more cash, which is in line with 
our hypothesis. 
Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) investigate cash holdings for 
international firms in 1998 and find that firms from low shareholder protection countries 
actually held more cash than those from better shareholder protection countries. The 
authors attribute these findings to an agency problem that allows managers in weak 
protection countries to hold cash which can then be misappropriated. Their results are 
opposite to those we report in Panel A of Table 2. To investigate this issue further, we 
divide our sample into pre and post 1998 which is the year used in the Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith, and Servaes (2003) study and also coincides with the emerging markets financial 
crises. We also use the alternative measures of investor protection used in their study.  In 
column (1) of Panel B in Table 2, we find that the common law investor protection index 
used in Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes  (2003) does indeed have a negative effect on 
cash holdings prior to 1998.  Interestingly, the effect reverses after 1998.  The reversal of 
this sign suggests increased investor sophistication over time that limits the ability of 
corporate managers to hold cash for the purposes of misappropriation. Instead, the 
corporate managers now need to explicitly signal adherence to a higher degree of investor 
protection in order to maintain higher cash holdings.  
We also examine the anti-director rights (LLSV-IPI) also used in Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith, and Servaes (2003) for periods before and after 1998. In Panel B column (3), the 
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anti-director rights do not affect the level of cash holdings before 1998, while in column 
(4) the anti-director rights become statistically significant and positive after 1998. More 
importantly, in columns (5)-(8) we measure the effects of the main investor protection 
measures in our study – KKM-IPI and LLSV2-IPI – on cash holdings both before and 
after 1998. The effects of investor protection on cash holdings are positive and significant 
both before and after 1998 for both measures. We conjecture that there are three possible 
explanations for the differences in the effect of investor protection between our IPI and 
the IPI used in Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003). First, investors became 
increasingly aware of the importance of better protection on the optimal level of cash 
holdings after the Asian, Russian, and Latin American financial crises of 1997-1998. 
With this increased awareness, investors forged a stronger link between their valuation of 
cash and the strength of investor protection.  Second, the IPI measures we employ 
comprehensively capture various facets of investor awareness much better than the earlier 
IPI measures based on a single factor dummy variable like Common Law. Third, the 
KKM-IPI measure we use has rich time-series and cross-sectional variation, whereas the 
earlier measures have fixed values for a given country over time. The examples of 
Germany and Belgium discussed in the descriptive statistics section highlight some 
potential concerns with continued use of the LLSV-IPI measure which was constructed in 
the pre-crisis era. Overall, our findings suggest that managers of firms in poor investor 
protection countries disgorge excess cash balances after 1998, or investors value cash 





the regression results reported in Table 2, we control for other firm-specific determinants 
of cash holdings that are identified by OPSW (1999).  Many firm-level characteristics are 
statistically significant and are in the expected directions in Panels A and B, consistent 
with prior literature. Larger firms, as well as firms with greater levels of net working 
capital and debt, hold less cash, while firms operating in industries with more volatile 
cash flows and greater R&D expense hold more cash. 
Valuation of excess cash 
 
Since 1998 was a year encompassing financial crises in Asia, Russia, and Latin 
America, perhaps investors examined managerial behavior more closely, particularly 
because poor governance is allegedly a major contributor to the crises (Mitton, 2002; 
Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Stiglitz, 1998). 
Because managers can easily squander cash in poor investor protection countries, 
investors view the value of cash differently depending on the IPI of the country that the 
firm operates in. If the change in sign is due to greater investor awareness after 1998, we 
expect that the value of cash is greater for firms in better investor protection 
environments after this period.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
       9 In untabulated robustness tests, we estimate the effect of the IPI on excess cash using the same set of 
IPI measures reported in Panel B of the Table 2 but using a two-step regression based on a measure of 
excess cash holdings closely following Frésard and Salva (2010). In step (1) we obtain excess cash (XCash) 
defined as the residual (εi,t) from the regression equation shown in the Table header of the Table 3. In step 
(2) we examine the effects of shareholder protection (IPI) on excess cash holdings. The Common Law-IPI 
and LLSV-IPI measures used in Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) have statistically insignificant 
effects on excess cash holdings for both pre and post-1998 periods. However, the KKM-IPI and LLSV2-IPI 
measures in this study continue to have statistically significant positive effects on excess cash holdings and 
the magnitude of IPI coefficient is close to that in Panel B of Table 2. 
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We examine whether the valuation of excess cash holdings is higher for firms 
with better shareholder protection in Table 3.  We use the Fama and French (1998) model 
and regress firm value on the excess cash holdings using the same set of control variables 
as Frésard and Salva (2010). We estimate the model in two steps. The first step 
regression estimates the normal cash holdings for a firm based on a cash determinants 
model.  The excess cash holding (Xcash) for a firm is the residual term obtained from this 
first step.  In the second step, Xcash becomes an explanatory variable and firm valuation 
is the dependent variable. The main variable of interest is the interaction between IPI and 
Xcash. This variable measures if investors value the excess cash more for firms with 
strong investor protection. The coefficients of the interaction term IPI*Xcash for the 
period after 1998 are 1.048 for Common Law-IPI, 0.151 for LLSV2-IPI, and 0.144 for 
KKM-IPI, all statistically significant at the 5% level or better. Indeed, investors value the 
excess cash more in countries with strong investor protection after 1998, verifying our 
conjecture that investors became more wary of poor corporate governance after the 
emerging market crises in 1997-98. This change in sign is also an important contribution 
to the cash valuation literature and was not documented before. Once again it suggests 
increased investor sophistication over time. Investors appear to be demanding greater 
investor protection after 1997-98 and are punishing firms with weaker protection by 
discounting their cash holdings more heavily.  
Cross listing and cash holdings 
 
To test our second hypothesis, we measure the impact of cross listing on the 
firm’s cash holdings. The improvements in investor protection upon U.S. cross listing 
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include stronger shareholder protection, more stringent disclosure requirements, and a 
lower degree of information asymmetry between shareholders and  managers (Doidge, 
Karolyi, Lins, Miller, & Stulz 2009). We define Cross listing as an indicator variable 
with the value of 1 for ADR firm-years after their cross listing date and 0 before the cross 
listing date. The variable is also set to zero for the non-cross-listed matched control 
sample firm-years for the entire sample period., We create a level III ADR indicator 
variable to test our third hypothesis which states that cash holdings increase more for 
level III ADRs relative to other types of ADRs. Our main regression analysis has the log 
of the net cash ratio as the dependent variable, Cross listing and level III ADR as the key 
explanatory variables, inflation and firm level characteristics that are identified by OPSW 
(1999) as control variables, and year ( ), country ( ), and industry (v)  fixed effects as 
shown in equation (2) below: 
, , ,  
 
																																												 ∑ , ,    (2) 
 
 
The results of this regression are presented in Table 4. As we hypothesized, cross 
listing is a significant predictor of cash holdings. For the overall sample, it is associated 
with a 16.2% increase in cash holdings reported in column (1) and 13.5% increase in 
excess cash reported in column (2). In the third and fourth columns we show that the 
effect of cross listing on cash holdings becomes statistically positive only after 1998.  
Thus, the results lend support to our second hypothesis that by bonding with more 
stringent rules and laws in the U.S. market, firms are able to increase their cash holdings 
as their liquid assets receive a higher valuation. 
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The benefits of bonding can vary significantly across firms because the net 
improvement in investor protection depends on both the level of ADR listing targeted in 
the U.S. and the quality of shareholder protection available in the home markets. We first 
analyze these effects separately in Table 4. The higher the level of ADR listing, the more 
stringent the listing requirements are and the higher the gains from cross listing should be. 
The magnitude of the coefficient on level III ADR is economically and statistically 
significant and positive in five out of the six models with the exception of the regression 
in column (3).  
In the last two columns of Table 4, we divide the sample into two groups based on 
whether the country of origin for a given ADR is an emerging market or a developed 
market as the countries in these groups can provide very different levels of investor 
protection quality. Indeed, the average shareholder protection score of emerging markets 
is 0.1, much below the average of 8.9 for the developed markets as measured by KKM-
IPI. Likewise, the average accounting standards rating of emerging markets is 53.5, 
which is also below the average rating of 66.3 for the developed markets. Thus, firms 
from emerging markets may have more to gain from a U.S. listing than firms from 
developed markets where investor protection is already strong. The statistically 
significant positive coefficients for the cross listing variable in columns (5) and (6) of 
Table 4 imply that firms from both emerging markets and developed markets experience 
an increase in cash holdings after cross listing. The increase in cash holdings of 21.8% 
for emerging market firms is, however, significantly higher than the increase in cash 
holdings of 5.9% for the developed market firms. This result represents a preliminary 
piece of evidence supporting our third hypothesis, which states that the effect of cross 
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listing in the U.S. on cash holdings is greater for firms from countries with poor investor 
protection compared to that for firms from countries with relatively better investor 
protection. The signs on the coefficients for firm level characteristics are similar to those 
reported in the previous section. We present another test of the third hypothesis in section 
4.2.5. 
Robustness test of the effects of bonding 
 
So far we have shown a positive association between the magnitude of increase in 
the cash holdings ratio and the difference between the ending value of shareholder 
protection (which could be higher with level III ADRs than others) and the beginning 
value of shareholder protection (which could be lower for ADRs from countries with 
poorer scores than others). Admittedly, apart from bonding with better investor protection, 
some firms cross list in the U.S. market to tap the global capital markets for new 
financing.  Intuitively, some of the increase in cash holdings following level III ADRs 
might be attributable to the cash generating effect of new equity offerings (IPO effect). 
We remove firm-year observations for two years prior to and after the base year that the 
firms first cross list in the U.S. market. We report the results in column (1) of Panel A in 
Table 5. The incremental effect of level III ADRs on cash holdings remains significant 
and positive after removing the five-year period surrounding the IPO, during which any 
excess cash is likely to be utilized for capital purchases stated in the prospectus. The 
statistical significance level, the direction, and the magnitude of the coefficients for the 
other variables are consistent with results in Table 4. Further, we conjecture that the IPO 
effect would exist only for level III ADRs and privately placed ADRs (SEC rule 144A) 
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that actually raise cash by issuing new shares. As a result, we investigate if there is a 
cross listing effect on cash holdings for level I and level II ADRs and present the results 
in column (2) of Table 5. We obtain similar results as in column (1). Thus, the conclusion 
that cash holdings increase with cross listing due to the bonding effects is robust to the 
exclusion of IPO effects.  
Higher cash holdings are potentially more valuable for financially constrained 
firms than for firms without financial constraints (Gamba and Triantis, 2008). Cross 
listing enables foreign firms to tap the U.S. capital market and thereby lowers financial 
constraints. Thus, we verify the robustness of our findings in sub-samples of firms from 
financially unconstrained countries with high sovereign credit ratings (from AAA+ to A-) 
and those from constrained countries with lower sovereign credit ratings (i.e., BBB+ and 
below) by Standard & Poor’s. We report the results for these two sub-groups of firms in 
column (3) and column (4) of Table 5. The findings support our hypothesis that firms 
hold more cash after cross listing in the U.S market irrespective of the financial constraint 
status in their home market. Further, in untabulated regressions for a subsample of 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms, we repeat the same analysis as in Table 
3 and 4 and the coefficients of cross listing and type III ADR remain positive and 
statistically significant. Thus, financial constraints are not driving our main result of 
higher cash holdings for cross-listed firms.  
As a further robustness check, we define cash over total sales as an alternative 
cash holdings measure and repeat the regression analyses with cash/total sales ratio as the 
new dependent variable in Panel B of Table 5. We find that the coefficient on cross 
listing ranges from 0.061 to 0.196 and is always statistically significant, analogous to the 
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models presented in Table 4 which have cash/net assets as the dependent variable.  These 
additional regression results are further evidence favoring our second and third 
alternative hypotheses. Likewise, in untabulated regressions of cash/total sales, we also 
repeat the equity-raising effects analysis of Panel A by excluding a five year period 
surrounding the listing event. We obtain results similar to those shown in columns (1) 
and (2) in that cross listing and level III ADRs coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant. We also perform a number of additional robustness tests and find our key 
results are robust to alternative sample formation methods and variable definitions.10  
 
Interplay of cross listing and home-market investor protection on firms’ cash 
holdings 
 
So far we have shown that firms hold more cash when shareholders are better 
protected. Since firms commit themselves to a higher degree of shareholder protection by 
cross listing in the U.S., their cash holdings increase after cross listing. Emerging market 
firms benefit more from cross listing relative to developed market firms. Since firms in 
                                                            
 
        10 These additional robustness tests include: (1) propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983), in which we obtain a statistically significantly positive effect of cross-listing on cash holdings for 
matched smaller groups of pairs; (2) the use of all non-cross-listed firms from our sample countries, 
without matching them with ADRs this time, and treating them as a comparison group relative to the cross-
listed firms; (3) following previous studies, re-estimating the model using the Fama and Macbeth (1973) 
cross-sectional model, which is estimated annually to utilize all the information in the regression for each 
year (OPSW, 1999); and (4) include the next 2 year’s geometric average sales growth as additional control 
variables in the regressions. The main finding i.e., the positive relation between cross-listing and cash 




our sample are from home markets with varying degrees of investor protection, we 
calibrate the degree of improvement due to cross listing more accurately in this section.  
To assess the joint effect of cross listing and the home markets’ investor 
protection quality, we classify the ADR issuing firms into two groups representing lower 
home country investor protection standards versus higher home country standards. The 
cutoff point for the classification is the median value of the respective investor protection 
variables. In other words, we form the low and high groups separately for the three 
investor protection variables, yielding six groups in all. Therefore, we classify firms from 
countries with values less than the median values of the level of KKM-IPI, LLSV2-IPI, 
and accounting standards in the low investor protection group and flagged them with a 1 
for the corresponding indicator variable. The same indicator variable is set to 0 for firms 
from countries with scores above the median values of the investor protection measure. 
Then, we interact the low home-country investment quality indicator variable with the 
cross listing variable.  
We present the results of this analysis in Table 6. The effects of low IPI and low 
accounting disclosure standards are analyzed in three separate columns. In columns (1) 
and (2) low shareholder protection variables have a statistically significant negative 
coefficient of -0.489 and -0.417 for KKM-IPI and LLSV2-IPI respectively. These results 
again confirm that cash holdings are lower for firms operating in countries with poor 
investor protection.  Likewise, the statistically significant positive coefficient on level III 
ADRs implies that the cash holdings ratio is more than 20% higher for level III cross-
listed firms. The statistically significant positive coefficient on the interactive variable 
implies that the increase in the cash ratio upon cross listing is 43.8% and 26.4% higher 
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based on KKM-IPI and LLSV2-IPI respectively for the cross-listed firms from low 
shareholder protection countries than for all other firms in the sample.11 Similarly, as 
shown in column (3), low level of accounting standards decreases cash holdings by 43.4% 
while cross listing increases the cash holdings ratio by 23.9% for a level III listing. Here 
too, the coefficient on the interaction term suggests the biggest increase in cash holdings 
of an additional 31.1% is experienced by cross-listed firms originating in countries with 
low accounting standards. Thus, the increase in the cash holdings ratio upon cross listing 
is of a higher magnitude for firms originating from countries with lower shareholder 
protection and lower accounting standards. This result is in line with our third hypothesis 
that firms from countries with poor investor protection have more to gain from cross 




Our study extends the transaction cost model of cash holdings by showing that the 
quality of investor protection is a statistically significant determinant of a firm’s cash 
holdings. While larger cash holdings can also be subject to expropriation, the relatively 
stronger governance of cross-listed firms suggests that such negative effects are 
minimized. We show that the relation between higher investor protection and cash 
holdings is particularly strong for the period after the Asian, Russian, and Latin American 
financial crises of 1997-1998, relative to the years prior to the crises. We attribute this 
                                                            
 
       11 These other firms include non-cross-listed firms from all countries as well as cross-listed firms from 
countries where the shareholder protection score is already high. 
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change to an increasing awareness among investors about the importance of good 
corporate governance after the financial crises. Investor protection features such as strong 
shareholder protection and reliable accounting and corporate information disclosure 
standards help reduce agency costs by improving corporate governance. Lower agency 
costs reduce the valuation discount applicable to a firm’s cash holdings. In turn, higher 
valuation of cash creates incentives for corporations to hold more cash.  
Our findings support this notion. Cross-listed firms have significantly higher cash 
holdings than their domestic non-cross-listed peers, even though cross-listed firms have a 
greater access to external finance. We show that firms hold more cash after cross listing 
because investors value the firm’s excess cash more highly after it cross lists in the 
United States. This is because investors believe that stronger shareholder protection in the 
U.S. market is an effective bonding mechanism to ensure that cash will be put to good 
use as a result of reduced misappropriation by managers. Further, after cross listing, firms 
originating from weaker shareholder protection markets increase their cash holdings by 
more than firms from relatively stronger shareholder protection markets. Similarly, firms 
listed as a level III ADR, which is required to adhere to the most stringent laws and 
regulations representing the highest shareholder protection, hold more cash relative to 
other types of ADRs. Thus, we conclude that the relative magnitude by which firms 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of key variables for 1992-2009 
Descriptive statistics on key firm specific variables are shown in Panel A for our sample 
of firm-years from 1992 to 2009. Net cash ratio, Cash/NA is the ratio cash and 
equivalents net assets, the the latter is computed as total assets minus cash holdings. 
NWC/NA is the ratio of net working capital to net assets. We measure firm size by its 
natural log of assets, adjusted using the CPI to 2009 dollars. The market-to-book ratio is 
computed as the ratio of the market value to common equity recorded in the books, which 
represents common shareholders' investment in a company. Following OPSW (1999), 
cash flow is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization, less interest, taxes, and common dividends. Total leverage is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets. For industry sigma or volatility of cash flows in each industry, 
we follow the method in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). First we compute the rolling 
average of the cash flows for each firm during the prior 10 years and then obtain the 
standard deviation of the averaged cash flow for all firms in a given industry sector. Panel 
B presents country-wise statistics. It describes the number of firm-year observations, 
number of firms, number of ADR firms, the average cash/net assets, cash/sales, the 
Investor Protection Index (IPI), and accounting standards scores for each country 
included in the sample. The KKM-IPI (2010) is constructed by summing over six 
governance indicators reported by KKM (2010) starting from year 1996. The LLSV2-IPI 
(1997, 1998) is the product of LLSV’s (1997, 1998) anti-director rights index and rule-
of-law index divided by 10. 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics of key variables for 1992-2009 




Cash/NA 0.23 0.69 0.07 39,766 
Cash/sales 0.34 1.40 0.08 39,766 
Mark-to-book ratio 2.32 34.01 1.00 24,888 
NWC/NA -0.23 0.40 -0.08 39,766 
Log  of real total asset 14.23 2.54 14.49 30,766 
Total leverage 0.20 0.21 0.15 39,766 
R&D/sales 0.02 0.06 0.00 39,766 
Cash flow/NA -0.63 1.15 0.07 39,766 
Industry sigma 0.75 0.19 0.76 39,766 
Expenditure 0.06 0.06 0.05 39,766 
Panel B. Country wise descriptive statistics 


































Australia 220 110 2,843 0.45 0.21 9.51 4.0 75 
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Austria 30 15 444 0.17 0.25 9.85 2.0 54 
Belgium 24 12 358 0.20 0.25 8.02 0.0 61 
Denmark 28 14 369 0.31 0.61 11.04 2.0 62 
Finland 26 13 389 0.14 0.10 11.35 3.0 77 
France 138 69 1,915 0.27 0.33 7.27 2.7 69 
Germany 124 65 1,782 0.21 0.23 9.23 0.9 62 
Greece 20 7 321 0.10 0.13 4.35 1.2 55 
Hong 
Kong 
216 108 2,929 0.28 0.47 7.57 4.1 69 
Ireland 32 18 485 0.54 0.62 9.24 3.1 - 
Italy 62 31 818 0.13 0.27 4.32 0.8 62 
Japan 362 182 4,512 0.21 0.17 6.58 3.6 65 
Netherlan
ds 
70 35 1,143 0.16 0.18 10.48 2.0 64 
New 
Zealand 
8 4 131 0.07 0.29 10.57 4.0 70 
Norway 40 20 586 0.13 0.16 10.21 4.0 74 
Portugal 18 9 266 0.06 0.11 7.00 2.6 36 
Singapore 54 27 647 0.17 0.24 8.84 3.4 78 
Spain 34 17 486 0.07 0.17 6.60 3.1 64 
Sweden 47 24 840 0.21 0.43 10.51 3.0 83 
Switzerlan
d 
55 28 794 0.58 0.69 10.49 2.0 68 
United 
Kingdom 




1,972 990 27,178 0.41 0.28 8.90 2.7 66.3 
Emerging markets 
Argentina 31 17 462 0.07 0.21 -1.01 2.1 45 
Brazil 201 100 3,071 0.10 0.16 -0.01 1.9 54 
Chile 46 23 765 0.07 0.10 6.75 3.5 52 
Colombia 6 3 76 0.06 0.16 -3.29 0.6 Na 
India 60 30 1,034 0.23 0.30 -1.34 2.1 57 
Indonesia 26 13 342 0.15 0.30 -4.26 0.8 4.2 
Israel 34 18 451 0.30 0.39 3.52 3.1 - 
Jordan 6 3 57 0.10 0.15 0.03 0.4 - 
Malaysia 10 5 148 0.14 0.22 2.16 2.7 76 
Mexico 125 63 1,903 0.10 0.23 -0.58 0.5 60 
Peru 18 9 288 0.09 0.19 -1.97 0.8 38 
Philippine
s 
14 7 226 0.14 0.24 -2.06 0.8 65 
South 
Africa 





47 25 714 0.22 0.24 3.1 1.1 62 
Taiwan 38 20 835 0.15 0.18 5.01 2.6 65 
Thailand 18 9 288 0.12 0.34 0.31 1.3 64 
Turkey 11 6 177 0.13 0.12 -1.06 1.0 51 












Table 2. The effect of investor protection on cash holdings in the home markets 
Sample period is 1992-2009 and the firms included in this analysis are non-cross-listed. Panel A reports the 
effects of investor protection index (IPI) on cash holdings. The dependent variable in all OLS regressions 
equation shown below is the natural log of ratio of cash/net assets, which is calculated as cash divided by 
net assets.  
12
, 1 2 , ,
3
( )ki t i t k i t i t
k
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The IPI variable has four alternative measures: (1) KKM-IPI, (2) LLSV2-IPI, and (3) the accounting 
ratings. The KKM-IPI is constructed by summing over six governance indicators reported by KKM 
(2010) starting from year 1996. The LLSV2-IPI (1997, 1998) is the product of LLSV’s (1997, 1998) 
anti-director rights index and rule-of-law index divided by 10. The accounting disclosure standards 
scores are from LLSV (1998). Inflation rate for each country in each year is obtained from the World 
Bank website http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. Firm size, market-to-book ratio, cash flow/net assets, 
total leverage, and industry sigma are defined in Table 1. Dividend dummy is an indicator variable and 
set to one if the firm paid a dividend in the observation year. The Panel B presents the changing effects 
of IPI between two periods:  before 1998 and after 1998. The IPI reported in columns 1 through 4 are 
common law and anti-director rights index employed by Dittmar et al (2003). The IPI reported in 
column 5 and 6 is the LLSV2-IPI. The main IPI measure used in this study is reported in the columns 7 
and 8; it is based on the KKM (2010).  
The t-statistics are bracketed. Non-fixed effect regressions are computed using two-way clustered 
robust standard errors from the variance-covariance matrix: &Firm Year Firm Year WhiteV V V V   (Petersen, 
2009). The t-statistics for regressions are based on White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 
The ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Effects of investor protection index (IPI) on cash holdings 







KKM-IPI (2010) 0.047*** 
(4.31)  
LLSV2-IPI (1997, 1998) 0.100** 
(2.90)  































































Firm-year observations 9,751 10,246 10,044 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.17 
 
Panel B: Changing effects of investor protection index (IPI) on cash holdings over time 
 IPI used in Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes 
(2003) LLSV2-IPI (1997-
1998) KKM-IPI (2010)  Common law-IPI         LLSV-IPI (1998) 










































(2.54)   
LLSV2-IPI 





















































































































































































effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year 
observations 3,750 11,139 3,750 11,139 1,898 11,139 3,750 11,139 
Adjusted R-





Table 3. Changing effects of shareholder protection on the valuation of excess cash 
over time 
We estimate Frésard and Salva (2010) cash valuation model for 2,012 firms from 39 countries for 1992 to 2009 period.  
We estimate a two-step regression. In step (1) we obtain excess cash (XCash) defined as the residual from the 
regression equation: 
Log Net Cash Ratioi,t  = β0+ β1Inflationi,t+ β2MV/BVi,t+ β3FirmSizei,t+ β4CashFlow/NAi,t+ β5NWC/NAi,t+  
β6Leveragei,t    + β7IndSigmai,t+ β8RD/Salesi,t+ β9DIVDummyi,t+ β10Expenditurei,t+εi,t   (1) 
 
In step (2) we analyze the valuation of excess cash holding based on the following model: 
 
MV = β0+ β1IPI*XCashi,t+ β2IPIi,t+ β3XCashi,t+ β4Ei,t+ β5dEi,t+ β6dEi,t+2+ β7dNAi,t+ β8dNAi,t+2+ β9RDi,t+ 
 β10dRDi,t+ β11dRDi,t+2+ β12Ii,t+ β13dIi,t+ β14dIi,t+2+ β15DIVi,t+ β16dDIVi,t+ β17dDIVi,t+2+  
β18dMVi,t+2+η+ω+v+εi,t           (2) 
 
The dependent variable, MV, is computed as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt (all variables 
including MV are scaled by book value of total assets; thus, the final dependent variable is the market to book ratio 
(MB)). IPI is the Investor Protection Index. IPI*XCash is the interaction term of IPI and XCash. Earnings before 
interest, E, is defined as net income plus interest. NA is net assets defined as total assets minus cash and equivalent. RD 
is the research and development expense and set to 0 if missing. I is the interest expense and DIV is the common 
dividend paid. dXi,t refers to the change in variable Xt from year t-2 to year t and dXi,t+2 represents the change in 
variable X from year to year t+2. The η, ω, and v are firm, year, industry fixed effects. The ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
Common Law-IPI LLSV-IPI LLSV2-IPI KKM-IPI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Before 
1998 After 1998 
Before 
1998 After 1998 
Before 
1998 After 1998 
Before 




















































































































































































































































































































effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year 
observations 945 4,904 945 4,812 945 4,904 945 4,904 









Table 4. Impact of cross listing on firms’ cash holding 
This table presents results of panel regressions estimated to test the impact of cross listing on firms’ cash 
holdings using cross-listed ADR firms and matched non-cross-listed control firms from 1992-2009. The 
dependent variable in all regressions except column (2) is the natural log of ratio of cash/net assets, which 
is calculated as cash divided by net assets. Column (2) uses the same 2-step regression for excess cash as 
reported in Panel C of table 2. Column (1), (5) and (6) are fixed-effects regressions. Cross listed is an 
indicator variable set to one if a firm is cross listed in the U.S.. Level III is an indicator variable set equal to 
1 for level III ADR and 0 for level I, level II, and restricted ADRs. Inflation rate is obtained from the World 
Bank. Firm size, market-to-book ratio, Cash flow/NA, total leverage, and industry sigma are defined in 
Table 1. Dividend dummy is an indicator variable set to one if a firm paid a dividend in the observation 
year. The t-statistics are bracketed. Non-fixed effect regressions are computed using two-way clustered 
robust standard errors from the variance-covariance matrix: &Firm Year Firm Year WhiteV V V V   (Petersen, 2009). 
The t-statistics for regressions are based on White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





































































































































































Year fixed effect Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Firm-year observations 17,307 17,307 2,267 15,040 5,100 12,207 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.15 0.31 
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Table 5. Robustness tests 
The dependent variable in Panel A regressions is the natural log of the ratio of cash/net assets, which is 
calculated as cash divided by net assets. Net assets are total assets net of cash holdings. Columns (1) shows 
the regression results by removing observations of cross listing year and two years before and after the 
cross listing. Column (2) presents the effects of cross listing on level I and level II ADR firms’ cash 
holdings by excluding level III ADRs. Firms with and without financial constraint in columns (3) and (4) 
are firms from countries rated A- and above (BBB+ and below), respectively, by Standard & Poor’s.  The 
dependent variable in Panel B regressions is the natural log of the ratio of cash/total sales. Cross listed is an 
indicator variable that is set to one if a firm cross listed in the U.S. and 0, otherwise. Level III is an 
indicator variable set equal to 1 for level III ADR and 0 for level I, level II, and restricted ADRs. Inflation 
rate is obtained from the World Bank. Firm size, market-to-book ratio, Cash flow/NA, total leverage, and 
industry sigma are defined in Table 1. The t-statistics for regressions are based on White’s 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 level, respectively.  
 




























































































































































































































Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Country 
fixed effect 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
fixed effect 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year 
observations 15,824 15,824 16,855 6,922 17,351 5,112 12,239 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.18 0.25 0.12 0.24 0.15 0.23 
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Table 6. Impact of cross listing on firms’ cash holdings – by home market investor 
protection  
This table presents results of panel regressions for the impact of cross listing on firms’ cash holdings using 
a matched control sample from 1992-2009. The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural log of 
ratio of cash/net assets:  
8
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LogNetCashRatio CrossListing LevelIIIADR InterTerm LowIPI Inflation ContrlVar       
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where cross listed is an indicator variable set to one if a firm cross listed in the U.S.. Level III is an 
indicator variable set equal to one if the firm is level III ADR and zero otherwise. Cross listing is 
interacted with the investor protection quality in the firms’ home market, which itself is constructed as 
a dichotomous variable set to 1 if the measure is below the median and 0 otherwise. Inflation rate is 
obtained from World Bank. Firm size, market-to-book ratio, Cash flow/NA, total leverage, and industry 
sigma are defined in Table 1. Dividend dummy is an indicator variable set to one if a firm paid a 
dividend in the observation year. The t-statistics are bracketed and are computed using two-way 
clustered robust standard errors computed from the variance-covariance matrix: 
&Firm Year Firm Year WhiteV V V V   (Petersen, 2009). The ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 







Low KKM-IPI (2010) -0.489*** 
(-4.90)  
Low  LLSV2-IPI (1997, 1998) -0.417*** 
(-7.11) 














Cross-listing*low  KKM-IPI (2010) 0.438*** 
(4.05)  






































































Firm-year observations 16,563 22,584 17,351 
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Panel A: Cash/Net assets five years before and five years after cross listing: Cross-listed 











Figure 2. Cash/Net assets 5 years before and 5 years after the base year for cross-listed 
(CL) and non-cross-listed (NCL) firms 
Cash/Net assets is the ratio of cash and equivalents to the net assets computed as total 
assets less cash and equivalents. The base year is the year that the firm cross listed. 














































Previous literature has reached a unanimous conclusion that excess cash is value-
enhancing for good governance firms. We find that, however, excess cash exacerbates 
agency problems such as excessive perquisites and overinvesting. Our empirical findings 
indicate that investors recognize these trade-offs and assign the highest value for 
excessive cash holdings of firms with good governance practices and low acquisitions. 
Excessive cash holdings are increasingly discounted as a firm engages heavily in external 
acquisitions. Further, investors attach lower value to excess cash for low growth firms, 
which are defined as firms with problems of overinvestment, poor management’s 









Investors’ valuation of excess cash mirrors how they expect the cash to be used 
(Fresard and Salva, 2010). When assessing the value of excess cash, investors account for 
factors that increase or decrease of their wealth. Among these factors, agency costs, 
according to Jensen and Meckling, 1976, are linked to a reduction in valuation of excess 
cash, evidenced by Fresard and Salva (2010) and Huang, Elkinawy, and Jain (2012). The 
problems with excess cash holding is that it can be legally deployed to undertake negative 
NPV acquisition for hidden motives such as empire building (Harford, Mansi, & 
Maxwell, 2008; Richard, 2006). Prior literature has suggested that strong shareholder 
protection mechanism can mitigate agency problems (La Lorta, Lopez-de-Silvanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, LLSV hereafter, 1998), and thereby increase valuation of the excess 
cash (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Frésard and Salva, 2010). However, these papers 
have relied heavily on country level indices or firm level governance variables instead of 
investigating the actual use of excess cash. Therefore, even though the results of 
aforementioned papers have made significant contribution to the literature in agency 
theory, they have left a substantial gap in testing free cash flow hypothesis in terms of 
deployment of excess cash and the firms’ investment policy. In this study, we disentangle 
the effect of investment policy and governance on excess cash. We find that the valuation 
of excess cash varies by free cash flow, growth opportunities, investment policy, and 
acquisitions. More specifically, excess cash is valued more for firms with good 
governance, low free cash flow, and low acquisitions. The free cash flow hypothesis 
predicts managers’ fringe benefits such as power, prestige, job satisfaction, etc. increase 
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with rapid acquisitions although these have negative NPV (Lang, Stulz, & Walking, 
1991). Thus, for poorly-governed firms, it destroys valuation of excess cash when high 
free cash flow is coupled with an investment policy of aggressively engaging in 
acquisitions. We find that excess cash is positively valued for organic capital expenditure, 
which we call built investment. This result is in sharp contrast with that of bought 
investment, i.e., acquisitions. Our study is the first to show that although the value that 
investors attach to excess cash is greater for a firm with good investor protection, the 
value-added effect disappears if (1) the firm has low growth and (2) the firm engages in 
acquisitions, particularly if it has high free cash flow.  
We focus our analysis on a sample of 3,679 U.S. firms over the study period from 
2003 to 2009.  The proxy for corporate governance, GOV, is produced by Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS)12 and is  a comprehensive firm-level governance measure 
incorporating 50 governance items and six governance categories which measure a 
variety dimension of minority shareholder protection. We examine whether the value of 
excess cash is affected by governance, free cash flow, acquisitions, and investment policy 
using panel regression. We show that the combination of investor’s valuation of excess 
cash is not only dependent on the strength of investor protection, but also contingent on 
the investment policy. We differentiate firms by the level of free cash flow, the scale of 
acquisitions, and investment opportunities. From the multivariate evidence, the positive 
value attached to the excess cash for well-governed firms disappears for low growth 
firms. Further, we show that the excess-cash premium is essentially zero for low firms 
                                                            
 
       12 ISS is a research firm and was acquired by RiskMetrics Group in 2007. 
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who invest in negative NPV project and has a shortage of positive NPV investment 
project even with the presence of good governance and low free cash flow. In contrast, 
there is a positive excess-cash premium for high growth firms. Finally, investors attach 
no positive value to excess cash if there is high level of free cash flow.  
II. Literature 
 
Agency Costs—Valuation of Excess Cash under Governance Framework 
 
Firms with good governance efficiently allocate resources, prohibiting managers from 
contemplating and undertaking unwarranted projects. Agency problems are manifested 
by the level of cash reserve (Frésard and Salva, 2010; Zerni, Kallunki, & Nilsson, 2010).  
The divergent interests managers and investors gives excess cash a significantly different 
meaning for each. For the agent, cash can be more easily converted to private benefit 
(Jensen, 1986). Hence, cash holding is a proxy for the desire of the agent to expropriate 
wealth from minority shareholders. Further, depending on the strength of investor 
protection, investors discount the value of excess cash.  Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
document the relation between corporate governance, the relative valuation of a firm’s 
cash holdings and the firm’s market value. They provide empirical evidence that the 
value of cash is substantially less if corporate governance is poor. Zerni, Kallunki, and 
Nilsson (2010) reveal that firms enjoy higher valuation of cash and other liquid assets by 
shareholders when they have better governance. Further, Frésard and Salva (2010) show 
that firms cross listing in the U.S., thereby incurring obligations to better protect investors 
and provide better governance, receive a higher valuation for excess cash. 
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Huang, Elkinawy, and Jain (2013) show that better governance leads to an increase in 
valuation of excess cash, further resulting in an increase in excess cash. The positive 
association between excess cash, good governance, and high firm valuation and the 
inverse association between excess cash, poor governance, and low firm valuation are 
further bolstered by the evidence reported by Kalcheva and Lins (2007) and Pinkowizt, 
Stulz, and Williamson (2006) for global firms.   
However, an unresolved question is whether the valuation of excess cash depends on 
potential investment opportunities that firms face. More specifically, we assume that 
value attached to excess cash varies depending on investment policy, i.e., on whether or 
not firms have good investments opportunities available and how firms deploy their 
excess cash such as by engaging in acquisitions.  
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis—Valuation of Excess Cash under Investment Policy 
Framework 
 
Cash rich firms may overinvest (Richardson, 2006). Free cash flow, as defined by 
Jensen (1988), is cash flow left after investing in all available positive NPV projects. 
Jensen (1988) free cash flow hypothesis states that managers will invest in negative NPV 
projects if there is ample free cash flow. Thus, there is an inverse relationship between 
the cash flow and valuation. Because excess cash is essential for growth firms (Almeida, 
Campello, & Weisbach, 2004), we hypothesizethat the value attached to excess cash 
varies by the level of free cash flow and the availability of investment opportunities. 
According to Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1991), Tobin’s q can serve as a proxy for firm 
growth opportunity set because Tobin’s q is less than 1 when the value of the firm’s 
assets in place is less than their replacement cost. This is a sufficient condition to define 
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firms with low q as firms have poor investment opportunities, 13, although there is bias in 
this measure (Lang, Stulz, and Walking, 1991). Additionally, the most recent empirical 
studies find supporting evidence to the notion that poor governance is associated with 
overinvestment (Billett, Garfinkel, & Jiang, 2011; Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008; 
Richardson, 2006). As such, effective and strong corporate governance would alleviate 
the agent problems of investing in wasteful projects and have less instances or less 
likelihood of overinvestment. According to Richardson (2006), overinvesting is spending 
decisions or activities beyond the needs to maintain assets in place. He finds that free 
cash flow hypothesis predicts that cash-rich firm may undertake overinvesting activities.  
The free cash flow hypothesis posits that cash flow increases the agency costs of firms 
with poor investment opportunities (Stulz, 1990, Lang, Stulz, & Walking, 1991). As a 
result, unless positive NPV projects are readily available, negative NPV projects are 
likely to be undertaken by managers with ample excess cash. In such cases, excess cash 
does not have attached positive value. For instance, in examining U.S. acquisition of 
foreign firms, Doukas (1994) reveals that the bidder returns are inversely related to free 
cash flow for firms with low q firms. Based on the foregoing discussion, we test the 
following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis I: For firms with poor availability of investments, the value of excess cash 
cash is  <= 0.  
                                                            
 
       13 Doukas (1995) treat low q firms as poorly managed overinvesting firms and in Lang and Litzenberger (1989), 
the Tobin’s q is an indicator of overinvestment. Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1989) interpret Tobin’s q as a measure of 
management’s performance. Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1991) classify low q firms as firms with poor investment 
opportunities because overinvesting activities involve investing negative NPV project when the positive NPV projects 
are exhausted. In this study, we generalize it as low q firms, representing firms with problems of overinvestment, poor 
management’s performance, and poor investment opportunities.  
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Free cash flow and acquisitions often go together. The free cash flow hypothesis 
suggests that firms with high cash flow and poor investment opportunities are more likely 
to engage in acquisitions that do not increase firm value (Lang, Stulz, & Walking, 1991; 
Stulz, 1990).  Cash flow is one of the sources of financing for acquisitions. Cash-rich 
makes acquisitions affordable. Harford (1999) concludes that cash-rich firms have higher 
likelihood than other firms to attempt acquisitions and these acquisitions are value 
decreasing. Moreover, a stream of literature has shown that firms’ cash reservoir 
significantly determines the investment policy. But what is unclear is whether investors 
attach positive valuation to excess cash with respect to acquisition decisions. Although it 
has been documented that good governance could mitigate value-destructive mergers and 
acquisition (Billet, Garfinkel, & Jiang, 2011; Lewellen, Loderer, & Rosenfeld, 1985; 
Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007), Richardson (2006) suggests that out of a large set of 
governance measures, they may not effectively curb overinvestment. We suspect that 
unless the free cash flow is consistently put into a good use and vigilantly -monitored by 
strong governance, investors attach non-positive value to excess cash, especially in the 
case of engaging in acquisitions when firms have large free cash flow. Hence, we test the 
following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis II: For firms with excess acquisitions, excess cash has a value <= 0. 




Our initial sample comprises firms in the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) 
dataset. According to Brown and Caylor (2006) the CGQ has a broader scope, 
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incorporates more firms and is more dynamic than other governance indices. The firm-
level minority shareholder protection data are available for a total of 8,735 firms for the 
years 2003 through 2009. Starting from 2003, every two years, the CGQ has added 
additional governance attributes to the CGQ matrix and more firms to the dataset. For 
consistency, we construct governance measures using the attributes that are available 
across all 7 years. Our sample comprises 5,696 firms. Following Jiraporn, Kim, and Kim 
(2011), we compute a comprehensive measure of the quality of the minority shareholder 
protection, GOV, which is constructed by awarding one point for each of the 50 
governance standards listed in the Appendix.14  The 50 items are divided into eight 
categories measuring a different dimension of minority shareholder protection. Topics 
covered include audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive 
and director compensation, ownership, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of governance index used in our study in relating to firm 
valuation has been documented by Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) for in a 
global context. 
For firms for which we have GOV, we obtain accounting and financial ratios from 
Compustat and the U.S. annual CPI index from CRSP. We convert CAD to USD. 
Following previous research, we assign zero to records with missing values for research 
and development expenses, taxes and interest expense, and dividend and share repurchase. 
We drop financial firms (SIC codes from 6000 to 6999) and utility firms (SIC codes 4900 
                                                            
 
14The minimum standard is provided and described in ISS Corporate Governance Quotient- CGQ Best Practices 
Manual published December, 2008. 
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to 4999) and firms with incorrect SIC codes (SIC codes 9900 to 9999). Further, we 
winsorize our sample at the 1 percentile and 99 percentile. Our final sample comprises 
3,808 firms and 19,946 firm-year observations. Variable definitions are provided in Table 
7.  
Test Design 
Value-Added Effect of Excess Cash and Good Governance. 
 
To gauge the effect of excess cash and governance on firm valuation contingent on 
investment strategy and decision, we employ valuation regression developed by Fama 
and French (1998). We regress firm value on the excess cash holdings using the same set 
of control variables as Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). The valuation regression is 
based on a two-step regression system employing excess cash to investigate the joint 
effect of governance and excess cash on firm valuation. For the first step we estimate: 
LogNetCashRatioi,t = β0 + β1 Inflationi,t +  β2 Tobinsq,t + β3 FirmSizei,t + β4 CF/NAi,t  
+ β5 NWC/NAi,t + β6 Leveragei,t + β7 VolCashi,t + β8 R&D/Salesi,t + β9 
DivDummyi,t  + β10 CapExp/NAi,t+ εi,t          (1) 
where LogNetCashRatio is the logarithm of Cash divided by NA in the main analysis 
and is the logarithm of the ratio of Cash to Sales in the robustness tests. The remaining 
variables are defined in Table 715. Excess cash is the residual obtained from the step 1 
                                                            
 
15 In equation (1), we do not include GOV as a control variable. As stated in Dittmar and Smith (2007, 
footnote 14), including or excluding governance measure in the optimal cash regression does not affect the 
excess cash estimates. In unreported results, we confirm that our conclusions remain unchanged with 




regression. We include all the cash holdings determinants identified by Opler, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and by Huang, Elkinawy, and Jain (2013).  
 In the second step, we estimate the valuation regression, which has been shown in 
previous studies to perform well. For a given variable, let Xi,t be the valuation of  the 
variable for firm i at time t, ΔXt-1 = (Xi,t-Xi,t-1)/Net Assetsi,t, and ΔXt = (Xi,t+1-Xi,t)/Net 
Assetsi,t.  We estimate the following equation: 
Vi,t = β0 + β1 GOV*XCashi,t + β2 GOVi,t + β3 XCashi,t + β4 Ei,t + β5ΔEt + β6ΔEt-1 + β7 ΔNAt 
+ β8ΔNAt-1 + Β9 R&Di,t + β10 ΔR&Dt + β11 ΔR&Dt -1 + β12 Ii,t + β13 ΔIt + β14 ΔIt-1 + 
β15Divi,t + β16ΔDivt  + β17ΔDivt-1 + β18 ΔVt-1 + ηi,t +ωi,t + εi,t   (2)  
All the variables are deflated using the net assets in the year t. The main variable of 
interest is the interaction between governance and XCash. The coefficient β1 represents 
the marginal effect of excess cash and corporate governance on firm valuation.  
 





Table 7, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics for all firms. The mean and 
median of GOV are 30.13 and 30 (n = 19,946 firm-years), respectively, which is close to 
the value of 22.82 (n = 9,878 firm-years) reported by Jiraporn, Kim and Kim (2011). 
Mean cash holdings is 23%, which is similar to the 17% reported by Opler, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson (1999) and the 22% reported by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
for U.S. firms. Huang, Elkinawy, and Jain (2013) report 23% for a sample of American 
Deposit Receipts (ADR).  
  
In Table 7, Panel B, we report results of the tests of the null hypothesis of equality of 
means for our sample of good and poor governance firms. We reject the hypothesis of 
equality for all of the variables except EBITSALES, ER, NWC/NA, and ROE. However, 
we find that poorly-governed firms have lower Tobin’s q, RD and VolCash. Cash/NA and 
Cash/Sales for poorly-governed firms are both higher. On the contrary, firms with good 
governance have remarkably higher levels of Cash and E. In addition, firms with good 
governance generally have larger Firm size and Leverage. More importantly, the well-
governed firms have greater Free Cash Flow and a higher AcquisitionRatio.   
Figure 3 shows the plot of Cash/NA by good vs. poor governance and by high vs. low 
Tobin’s q firms. We find that high Tobin’s q firms have higher Cash than low Tobin’s q 
firms regardless of the quality of governance.  
Multivariate Results 
 




Using a two-step procedure, we investigate whether there are differences in the 
valuation of firms’ Free Cash Flow related to Free Cash Flow, Acquisitions, CapExp, 
and Tobin’s q. We form eight samples by classifying firms as follows: high (low) Free 
cash flow, high (low) Acquisitions, high (low) CapExp, and high (low) Tobin’s q, using a 
median cutoff in each case except for Tobin’s q where the cutoff is 1.  
In step 1, we regress the log of Cash/NA against Inflation, Tobin’s q, Firm Size, 
CF/NA, NWC/NA, Leverage, VolCash, R&D/Sales, DivDummy, and CapExp/NA and 
obtain the residuals, which we call XCash. 
In step 2, we regress V against GOV*XCash, GOV, XCash, E, ΔE, Δ*E, ΔNA, Δ*NA, 
RD, ΔRD, Δ*RD, I, ΔI, Δ*I, DIV, ΔDIV, Δ*DIV, Δ*V. Δ indicates the change in a variable 
from t+1 to t and Δ* indicates the change in a variable from t to t-1. 
The results for the eight regressions are reported in Table 9, Panels B and C. As shown 
in Table 9, Panel B, column (1), the coefficient of the GOV*XCash is 0.18, which is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that the combination of excess cash 
and governance adds value for low Free cash flow firms. However, it does not add value 
for high Free cash flow firms as the interaction term GOV*XCash is statistically 
insignificant in column (2). On the effects of Acquisitions, the high Acquisitions appear to 
reduce valuation with statistically significant coefficient of -0.730. CapExp does not 
differ much between high and low firms as seen in Panel C, columns (5) and (6). Thus, 
our first hypothesis that there is no difference in value-added effect of excess cash and 
governance between high capital expenditure and low capital expenditure firms holds.  
In Table 9, Panel C, the columns (7) and (8), we report the valuation differences by 
high and low Tobin’s q. Obviously, excess cash and governance lowers valuation for low 
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Tobin’s q firms and improves valuation for high Tobin’s q firms, supporting our first 
hypothesis. To further investigate this valuation difference, we classify firms into four 
groups according to median values of both Free cash flow (FCF) and Tobin’s q (q). The 
results are shown in Table 10. The coefficient of the key variable GOV*XCash is 
statistically significantly negative for low Free cash flow and low Tobin’s q firms, 
however, is statistically significantly positive for low Free cash flow and high Tobin’s q 
firms. Thus, we conclude that excess cash and governance does not add value to low 
Tobin’s q firms, supporting our first hypothesis.  
The Effect of FCF and Acquisition 
 
Continuing our investigation of firms’ investment, in this section, we examine the 
impact of the acquisitions. We create a dichotomous variable, AfterBefore, with value of 
1 indicating after acquisitions and 0 before. We let FCF = 1 ( = 0) if a firms’ Free Cash 
Flow is greater (less) than its median value in a given year. We conduct a difference-in-
difference (DID) test by interacting AfterBefore with FCF, creating DID values. DID 
measures the impact of high FCF and acquisitions on valuation after taking into account 
the valuation difference between the high and low Free Cash Flow firms before 
acquisitions. We report the result for poorly-governed firms in column (1) and for firms 
with good governance in column (2). The DID is statistically significantly negative in 
column (1), implying that high free cash flow and engaging in acquisitions is value-
destructive for poorly-governed firms. This does not hold for firms with good governance, 
however, because the DID is statistically insignificant in column (2). To further advance 
our analysis, we then form four groups: low FCF low acquisitions, high FCF high 
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acquisitions, high FCF low acquisitions, and low FCF high acquisitions using the median 
value of the free cash flow and acquisitions. The analysis results are given in Table 10. 
Again, the statistically significantly positive coefficient of 0.14 reported in column (2) 
suggests that there is an increase in valuation as a result of excess cash and good 
governance, when both free cash flow and acquisitions are low. In column (3) where both 
the free cash flow and acquisitions are high, the GOV*XCash is statistically insignificant.  
In contrast, excess cash and good governance reduce valuation if high acquisitions, albeit 
the free cash flow is low as can be seen in column (5). These results support our second 
hypothesis that excess cash and governance does not add value to firms that engage in 
acquisitions and are consistent with the notion that high acquisitions destroy value.  
Determinants of Acquisitions 
 
It has shown that the high acquisitions do not add value to firms. Thus, it is natural to 
explore the determinants of firms’ decision and the likelihood of acquiring other firms. 
To this end, we estimate a three-step regression. First, we obtain the excess cash from the 
first step one regression as shown in equation (1). Then we use a logit model by regress 
firm characteristics on a dummy variable, which is set to 1 if the firm acquired other 
firms in a given year and set to 0 if there are no acquisition activities. In the third step, we 
interact the predicted probability obtained from the second step logit model with the 
excess cash derived from the first step to estimate the combined effect of excess cash and 
firms’ likelihood to acquire other firms on valuation. The logit regression outcomes are 
shown in columns Panel A, columns (1) and (2) where we report the coefficient estimates 
and odds ratio (OR). The OR facilitates the interpretation of the coefficient. The 
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probability of acquiring is positively associated with the strength of governance with an 
OR 1.009. That is, one unit increase in governance, we expect to see 1 % increase the 
odds of acquiring. This result is consistent with our univariate result reported in Table 7 
that the acquisition ratio in good governance firms is statistically higher than that of poor 
governance firms. In addition, firms that issue debt is associated with nearly 1.4 times 
higher odds to acquire other firms than firms that do not issue debt. Moreover, for one 
unit increase in R&D expense, we expect to see 54% increase in the odds of acquiring 
other firms. Similarly, one unit increase in firm size and in cash flow volatility is 
associated with respetive14% and 8% increase in odds of acquiring. However, one unit 
increase in leverage ratio, capital expenditure, tax ratio, and cash holdings is associated 
with a decrease in the odds of acquiring. Firms with losses have 14% decreases in odds to 
acquire relative to the firms with profits. Next, we move to the effect of excess cash and 
expected probability to acquire on valuation. As shown in columns (1) to (4), the excess 
cash together with the estimated probability to acquire does not add value to firms with 
high free cash flow. There is an increase in value when firms have low capital 
expenditure, high capital expenditure, and low free cash flow with low capital 
expenditure firms have highest improvement in valuation. In Panel B, we groups firms by 
good vs. poor governance and by high vs. low free cash flow. Again, the interaction term 
of Prob*XCash is statistically insignificant when poorly-governed firms have high cash 
flow. The coefficient estimate is statistically significantly positive for all other groups 
with the incremental change in a descending order of low FCF and good governance > 
good governance > good governance and high FCF >poor governance > poor governance 
and low FCF. We believe that the valuation difference and the sequence of valuation by 
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groups result from the fact that good governance firms tend to make wise acquisition 
decisions that create wealth for investors, while poorly-governed firms may invest in 
marginal profit acquisition projects. This result is parallel to the Doukas’s (1995) finding 
that high q bidders have substantially higher returns than low q bidders. As a result, we 
find strong evidence that excess cash does not add value to firms with high acquisitions, 
particularly for poorly-governed firms with high free cash flow.  
Robustness 
 
We have presented the evidence in supporting our hypotheses using the conventional 
measures of cash ratio. Now we move to probe into the validity of our findings. We 
employ a battery of robustness tests. First, we examine whether our results still hold 
using alternative measure of cash ratio. Following Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) 
we use the log value of the ratio of cash to sales as an alternative measure of liquidity. In 
untabulated tables, the results are consistent as reported in Tables 9 to Table 13.16  
The paper tests the robustness of these results using alternative empirical models 
including two-step Heckman Selection Model17 to approach the endogeneity inherent in 
the relationship between governance and firms’ excess cash and between the governance 
and acquisition decision. As presented in Table 14, the firms in high acquisition group in 




16 These results are available upon request. 
17 Acquisition decision mechanism: Acquisitioni* = z’ir+ui, Acquisitioni = 1 if Acquisitioni*  > 0 and 0 otherwise; 




GOV*XCash. The combination of excess cash and governance is only statistically 
significant and positive for low free cash flow and low acquisitions firms. This confirms 
our conclusion reached in the previous session that excess cash and governance does not 
add value to high free cash flow firms who engage in acquisitions.  
Further, we investigate to see if firms’ valuation varies depending on the available 
investment opportunities using the alternative cut-off point of Tobin’s Q. Although 
Tobin’s q greater (less) than unity has a theoretical appeal to classify firms as having 
poor  (good) investment opportunities, which has been used in many studies (Lang, Stulz, 
and Walkling,1991, Lang and Litzenberger, 1989), we use alternative way of identifying 
firms’ available investment opportunities by following Yoon and Starks (1995). 
Specifically, firms that have three year average Tobin’s q above (below) the unity are 
classified as having good (poor) investment opportunities. The conclusions remain the 
same as already reported in the Tables 6 through 10. Thus, our results and conclusion are 
not sensitive to how the cut-off point for high q and low q firms is determined.   
Finally, we perform the same set of analyses using the valuation model in the study of 
Frésard and Salva (2010) where the total assets is used to normalize the variables rather 
than net assets. We continue find the same results. Our results are consistent irrespective 
of the definition of excess cash and the ultimate choice of the cut-off point for classifying 
the high q and low q firms.  Our conclusions remain the same.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
Using a comprehensive firm-level governance score for a sample of U.S. firms, we  
investigate the impact of the excess cash in conjunction with governance on firm 
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valuation. Our investigation focuses exclusively on the U.S. firms by using a 
comprehensive firm-level governance score as our governance measure and finds 
supporting evidence to the agency theory and free cash flow hypothesis in the context of 
firm valuation. Moreover, contemporaneous studies of Frésard and Salva (2010) and 
Huang, Elkinawy, and Jain (2013) show that excess cash contributes more to firm 
valuation for firms with strong country-level governance than that of firms from weak 
country-level governance. Consistently, our evidence shows that with stronger firm-level 
governance, firm valuation increases in excess cash. Our findings extend the governance 
and firm valuation matrix from the country level to the firm level. Further, the effect of 
the excess cash and governance on valuation varies contingent upon free cash flow and 
acquisitions. Based on our empirical results, the combination of excess cash and good 
governance does not enhance valuation if firms have ample free cash flow and also 
heavily engage in acquisitions.  
Further, we differentiate our results by low q and high q firms. Harford (1999) and 
Richardson (2006) show that firms have rich cash tend to overinvest. From our univariate 
analysis, we find that high q firms tend to hold higher cash holdings relative to low q 
firms. Our evidence of low q firms have lower level of excess cash lends further support 
to spending hypothesis that as shown by Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) firms with 
weaker governance will spend cash more quickly rather than hoard it than those with 
stronger governance. From the panel regression analysis, we show that combination of 
excess cash and governance does not attribute more value to low q firms.  
We are the first study providing empirical evidence that the mechanism of strong 
governance and excess cash changing firm value is dependent on firms’ available 
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investment opportunity and the decisions and scale of acquisitions. In line with previous 
research, our findings supply further evidence in support of agency theory and free cash 
flow hypothesis. Our analysis implies that firms with good governance have higher odds 
of pursuing acquisitions, which could be due to a high initial market reward than 
subsequent investments (Doukas, 1995). However our analysis does not try to answer the 
question which forces in governances and how governance shape the firms’ decision in 
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List of Items Comprising the GOV Index 
 
We use the items below taken from the CGQ dataset. There are 50 items in total and each 
company receives one point for each criterion that it meets, which when summed is the 




1. Audit committee consists solely of independent outside directors. 
2. Auditors were ratified at the most recent annual meeting. 
3. Consulting fees paid to auditors are less than audit fees paid to auditors. 
4. Company has a formal policy on auditor rotation. 
 
B. Board of directors 
1. Managers respond to shareholder proposals within 12 months of shareholder meeting. 
2. CEO serves on no more than two additional boards of other public companies. 
3. All directors attend at least 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse for nonattendance. 
4. Size of the board of directors is at least six but not more than 15 members. 
5. No former CEO serves on board. 
6. CEO is not listed as having a “related party transaction” in proxy statement. 
7. Board is controlled by more than 50% independent outside directors. 
8. Compensation committee is comprised solely of independent outside directors. 
9. The CEO and chairman duties are separated or a lead director is specified. 
10. Shareholders vote on directors selected to fill vacancies. 
11. Board members are elected annually. 
12. Shareholder approval is required to change board size. 
13. Nominating committee is comprised solely of independent directors. 
14. Shareholders have cumulative voting rights to elect directors. 
15. Board guidelines are in each proxy statement. 
16. Policy exists requiring outside directors to serve on no more than five additional boards. 
 
C. Charter/bylaws 
1. A simple majority vote is required to approve a merger (not a supermajority). 
2. Company either has no poison pill or a pill that was shareholder approved. 
3. Shareholders are allowed to call special meetings. 
4. A majority vote is required to amend charter/bylaws (not a supermajority). 
5. Shareholders may act by written consent and the consent is non-unanimous. 
6. Company is not authorized to issue blank check preferred stock. 
7. Board cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can only do so under limited 
circumstances. 
 
D. Director education 





E. Executive and director compensation 
1. No interlocks exist among directors on the compensation committee. 
2. Nonemployees do not participate in company pension plans. 
3. Option repricing did not occur within last three years. 
4. Stock incentive plans were adopted with shareholder approval. 
5. Directors receive all or a portion of their fees in stock. 
6. Company does not provide any loans to executives for exercising options. 
7. The last time shareholders voted on a pay plan, ISS did not deem its cost to be excessive. 
8. The average options granted in the past three years as a percentage of basic shares 
outstanding did not exceed 3% (option burn rate). 
9. Option repricing is prohibited. 
10. Company expenses stock options. 
 
F. Ownership 
1. All directors with more than one year of service own stock. 
2. Officers’ and directors’ stock ownership is at least 1%but not more than 30% of total shares 
outstanding. 
3. Executives are subject to stock ownership guidelines. 
4. Directors are subject to stock ownership guidelines. 
 
G. Progressive practices 
1. Mandatory retirement age for directors exists. 
2. Performance of the board is reviewed regularly. 
3. A board-approved CEO succession plan is in place. 
4. Board has outside advisors. 
5. Directors are required to submit their resignation upon a change in job status. 
6. Outside directors meet without the CEO and disclose the number of times they met. 
7. Directors’ term limits exist. 
 
H. State of incorporation 






Figure 3. Cash/NA by Governance and Tobin’s q 
 
We measure the quality of a company’s firm-level governance using GOV, a 
comprehensive firm-level governance measure incorporating 50 governance items and 
six governance categories that measure a variety of dimensions of minority shareholder 
protection. Higher GOV score indicates better the firm-level governance. We classify 
firms as good (poor) governance firms when the GOV is above (below) the median. 
Cash/NA is cash and cash equivalent divided by NA. NA is the difference between total 
assets and cash and equivalent. Low (high) q firms are defined as firms have Tobin’s q 


































































































































Table 7. Definition of Variables 
 
This table reports the definition of the variables. The first variable is the governance 
measure and the remaining variables are listed alphabetically.  
Variable Definition 
GOV Firm-level governance measure: A comprehensive governance 
quality measure that is the sum of the 50 firm-specific items 
listed in the Appendix. 
AcquisitionDummy Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the acquisition method is not 
missing and 0 otherwise. 
AcquisitionRatio Acquisition (Compustat item 838) divided by NA. 
CapExp/NA Capital expenditure (Compustat item 842) divided by Total 
Assets. 
Cash Cash and short-term investments (Compustat item 120).  
Cash flow Earnings Before Interest (Compustat item 552) minus Interest 
paid-net (Compustat item 894)] minus Income tax-total 
(Compustat item 747) minus Dividends common/ordinary 
(Compustat item 542)] 
Cash/NA Cash divided by NA. 
Cash/Sales Cash divided by Sales. 
CF/NA Cash flow divided by NA.  
DIV Common dividend paid (Compustat item 845). 
DivDummy A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm pays a dividend in a 
given year and 0 otherwise. 
E Sum of Earnings (Compustat item 364), interest expense 
(Compustat item 894), deferred tax credits (Compustat item 
950), and investment tax credits (Compustat item 275). 
EBITSALES Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (Compustat item 815) 
divided by Sales. 
ER Retained earnings (Compustat item 364) divided by 
common/ordinary equity-total (Compustat item 116) 
Firm Size Logarithm of Total Assets. 
Free cash flow Operating Cash Flow minus capital expenditure (Compustat 
item 842) minus RD (see Denis and Sibilkov (2010). 
Free cash flow ratio Free cash flow divided by Total Assets. 
I Net interest paid (Compustat item 894).  
Inflation Computed based using annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 






Table 8. Definition of Variables (Cont.) 
IssueDebt Dummy variable that equals 1 if the change in book value of 
total long-term debt (data 9 plus data 34) exceeds five percent of 
the pre-issue book value of assets (data 6-data 9) and 0 
otherwise—following D’Mello and Miranda (2010).  
Leverage Long-term debt (Compustat item 150) divided by Total Assets. 
LossDummy A dummy variable that equals 1 if net income is negative and 0 
otherwise. 
NA Total Assets minus Cash.  
NWC/NA Net working capital (Compustat item 473) divided by NA.  
Operating Cash Flow Earnings before interest and taxes (Compustat item 551) minus 
income taxes-total (Compustat item 747) plus depreciation and 
depletion (Compustat item 856)] 
R&D/Sales RD divided Sales.  
R&D/TA RD divided by Total Assets.  
RD Research and development expense (Compustat item 815). 
ROE Net income (loss) (Compustat item 630) divided by 
common/ordinary equity-total (Compustat item 116). 
Sales Sales/Turnover (Net) (Compustat item 715). 
Salesgrowth (St + St-1)/2 where S = Sale/turnover net (Compustat item 715) 
and t is a given year. 
TaxRatio Income Tax (Compustat item 747) divided by Total Assets. 
Tobin’s q [Market Value-Total minus Fiscal (Compustat item 1027)] 
divided by Total Assets. 
Total Assets Total assets (Compustat item 109). 
V Market value-total-fiscal (Compustat item 1027) plus liabilities–
total (Compustat item: 307). 
VolCash For each firm, we collect a time series of yearly values of Cash 
Flow. For each industry (based on 4 digit SIC codes), we pool 
the observations of Cash Flow for the years 1992 through 2001 
for all of the firms within the industry and calculate the standard 
deviation of these values. We assign this standard deviation to 
each of the firms in the industry for 2001. Values for other years 
are calculated similarly. 
VolEarnings For each firm, we collect a time series of yearly values of E. For 
each industry (based on 4 digit SIC codes), we pool the 
observations of E for the years 1992 through 2001 for all of the 
firms within the industry and calculate the standard deviation of 
these values. We assign this standard deviation to each of the 






Table 9. Descriptive Statistics and Comparison of Firm Characteristics 
We measure the quality of a company’s firm-level governance using GOV, a comprehensive firm-level 
governance measure incorporating 50 governance items and six governance categories that measure a variety of 
dimensions of minority shareholder protection. The variables are defined in Table 7. A higher GOV score 
indicates better firm-level governance. In Panel B, we classify firms as good (poor) governance firms when GOV 
is above (below) its median. We test the null hypothesis that the means for good- and poor-governance firms are 
equal using a t test. N ranges from 18,150 to 19,946. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 
levels, respectively. 
Firm characteristics N Mean Median STD 25th 75th 
Panel A: All Firms 
GOV 19,946 30.13 30.00 4.97 27.00 34.00 
AcquisitionDummy 19,946 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 
AcquisitionRatio 19,276 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 
CapExp/NA 19,946 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.06 
Cash1 19,859 320.5 39.57 1,701 8.05 152.6 
Cash flow 19,946 230.5 18.29 1,174 0 104.5 
Cash/NA 19,946 0.23 0.14 0.24 0.04 0.35 
Cash/Sales 19,946 1.02 0.12 4.43 0.03 0.41 
CF/NA 19,946 -0.01 0.07 0.29 0.00 0.11 
DIV1 19,946 51.82 0.00 447.9 0.00 1.84 
DIVDummy 19,946 51.82 0.00 447.9 0.00 1.84 
E1 19,849 140.7 6.25 1,173 -5.28 56.78 
EBITSALES 19,601 -5.97 0.06 264.8 -0.02 0.12 
ER 19,807 -1.53 0.30 66.28 -0.71 0.76 
Firm Size 19,946 6.09 6.32 2.64 4.34 7.99 
Free cash flow 19,861 -0.19 0.02 3.13 -0.10 0.07 
Free cash flow ratio 19,861 -0.19 0.02 3.13 -0.10 0.07 
I1 18,150 50.19 2.56 311 0.20 22.35 
Inflation 19,946 2.55 2.72 1.22 1.88 3.42 
IssueDebt 19,946 0.52 1.00 0.50 0 1 
Leverage 19,946 0.49 0.45 0.32 0.27 0.63 
LossDummy 19,946 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
NA1 19,862 2,918 307.5 13,800 72.56 1,327 
NWC/NA 19,946 0.04 0.04 0.22 -0.06 0.16 
Operating Cash Flow 19,849 325.6 24.51 1,596 1.09 139.8 
R&D/Sales 19,946 0.37 0.01 1.84 0.00 0.10 
R&D/TA 19,946 0.07 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.08 
RD1 19,946 45.03 0.86 166.5 0.00 18.59 
ROE 19,845 -0.15 0.08 8.87 -0.07 0.16 
Sales       
Salesgrowth 19,946 2,053 336.4 5,445 39.83 1,376 
TaxRatio 19,843 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.04 
Tobins’ q 19,946 2.69 2.05 4.69 1.20 3.53 
Total Assets1 19,862 2,919 308 13,800 73.26 1,327 
V1 19,862 5,128 532.4 22,490 124.5 2,221 
VolCash 19,946 0.47 0.17 0.81 0.07 0.58 
Table 8—Continued 
Panel B: Comparison of Firm Characteristics by Governance Category 
 Good Governance Poor Governance   
Mean  STD Mean STD T-statistics  
GOV 34.31 2.63 26.20 3.10 199.8**  





AcquisitionDummy 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.36 7.35**  
CapExp/TA 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 3.98**
Cash1 540.1 2,371 114.1 488.2 17.28**  
Cash flow 401.7 1,630 69.83 356.7 19.57**  
Cash/Sales 0.79 3.79 1.24 4.95 -7.24**  
Cash/NA 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.25 -11.21**  
CF/NA 0.02 0.25 -0.04 0.32 13.19**  
DIV1 95.61 633.1 10.74 97.23 13.03**  
DIVDummy 0.99 0.07 0.99 0.10 3.63**  
E1 255.3 1,649 32.87 293.2 13.04**  
EBITSALES -5.40 211 -6.51 307 0.30  
ER -1.32 85.00 -1.73 41.59 0.42  
Firm Size 6.53 3.01 5.67 2.16 23.01**  
Free cash flow 183.2 1,176 22.30 245.2 13.17**  
Free cash flow 
Ratio 
-0.09 0.76 -0.28 4.29 4.52**  
Inflation 2.51 1.35 2.59 1.08 -4.75**  
I1 83.42 433.6 18.20 81.89 13.96**  
IssueDebt 0.64 0.48 0.41 0.49 33.84**  
Leverage 0.51 0.29 0.47 0.35 8.05**  
LossDummy 0.31 0.46 0.40 0.49 -14.08**  
NA1 5,042 19,191 921 3,883 20.67**  
NWC/NA 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.25 0.62  
RD1 72.74 218.1 19.05 88.03 22.53**  
R&D/TA 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.15 -6.94**  
Operating Cash Flow 569.5 2,216 95.9 464.5 20.55**  
R&D/Sales 0.30 1.64 0.43 2.01 -5.11**  
ROE -0.13 9.26 -0.17 8.49 0.32
Salesgrowth 3,206 6,892 972 3,240 28.99**  
TaxRatio 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05 7.06**  
Tobins’ q 2.76 4.62 2.63 4.76 2.01*  
Total Assets1 5,043 19,190 922 3,883 20.67**  
VolCash 0.43 0.77 0.51 0.85 -6.85**  




Table 10. Valuation of Excess Cash 
In step 1, we regress the log of Cash/NA against Inflation, Tobin’s q, Firm Size, CF/NA, NWC/NA, Leverage, 
VolCash, R&D/Sales, DivDummy, and CapExp/NA and obtain the residuals, which we call XCash. Panel A 
presents the results for stage 1.  
All variables not defined here are defined in Table 7. We create a new variable, GOV*XCash, by multiplying 
GOV by XCash. If Tobin’s q  >= 1 ( < 1) the firms are classified as having a high (low) value (see Lang and 
Litzenberger, 1989). For each of the remaining classification variables, high (low) is greater (less) than the 
median. Each variable is for firm i at time t unless otherwise indicated. Δ indicates the change in a variable from 
t+1 to t and Δ* indicates the change in a variable from t to t-1. In step 2, we regress V against the variables listed 
in column 1 of Panels B.  
We report the results of the estimation of this regression for eight subsets of the sample, corresponding to low and 
high values of each of the four variables indicated. Panel B presents results for the firms with low and high values 
of Free cash flow and Acquisition, in turn, and Panel C for the firms with low and high values of  CapExp and 
Tobin’s q, in turn. t-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 
levels, respectively.  

















































Table 9. Valuation of Excess Cash —Continued 
Panel B: Results for Free cash flow and Acquisition 










































































































































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year obs. 5,016 5,885 6,578 4,323 
Adjusted R-sq. 0.96 0.61 0.95 0.63 
Table 9. Valuation of Excess Cash —Continued 
Panel C: Results for CapExp and Tobin’s q 


































































































































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year obs. 5,051 5,850 4,810 6,091 





Table 11. Valuation of Excess Cash 
 
We retain the variables XCash and GOV*XCash created in step 1 as described in Table 9. All 
variables not defined here are defined in Table 7. Each variable is for firm i at time t unless 
otherwise indicated. Each variable is for firm i at time t unless otherwise indicated. Δ indicates 
the change in a variable from t+1 to t and Δ* indicates the change in a variable from t to t-1. In 
step 2, we regress V/NA against the variables listed in column 1. If Tobin’s q >=1 ( < 1) the 
firms are classified as having a high (low) value (see Lang and Litzenberger, 1989). For Free 
cash flow, high (low) is greater (less) than the median. t-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively.  
Variables Free cash flow Tobin’s q 



































































































































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year obs. 2,103 3,178 2,912 2,707 





Table 12. The Effect of Free Cash Flow and Acquisitions by Governance—DID 
Step 1 is the same as in Table 9. The step 2 dependent variable is V/NA. A firm has good (poor) 
governance if its value of GOV is above (below) the median. Each variable is for firm i at time t unless 
otherwise indicated. Δ indicates the change in a variable from t+1 to t and Δ* indicates the change in a 
variable from t to t-1. BeforeAfter is a dummy variable that equals 1 if ACQMETH (Compustat item 
63) is not missing. FCF is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firms’ Free cash flow is high if it is 
greater than its median value. DID is BeforeAfter multiplied by FCF. t-statistics are in parentheses. The 
remaining variables are defined in the Table 7. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 






























































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes 




Firm-year obs. 5,028 5,873 







Table 13. Valuation of Excess Cash by Governance, FCF, and Acquisitions 
The dependent variable in the step 1 regression is the logged net cash ratio which is 
computed as cash/net assets. XCash and GOV*XCash are from the step 1 regression 
reported in Table 9. Each variable is for firm i at time t unless otherwise indicated. Δ 
indicates the change in a variable from t+1 to t and Δ* indicates the change in a variable 
from t to t-1. The remaining variables are defined in the Table 7. The step 2 dependent 
variable is the V/NA and the independent variables are listed in column 1. A firm has 
good (poor) governance if its value of GOV is above (below) the median. Free cash flow 
is high if it is greater than its median value. Acquisition is high if it is greater than its 
median value. t-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 






High FCF  
Low Acquisition 
(3) 



























































































































































































 (-25.58) (-22.40) (-32.73) (-27.66) 
Year fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year obs. 3,637 1,379 2,941 2,944 









Table 14. Valuation of Excess Cash by Governance, FCF, and Capital Expenditure 
The step 1 variables are as described in Table 9. The step 2 regression is a Logit regression model with Acquisition 
as the dependent variable. Prob is the predicted probability to acquire obtained from the step 2 regression. The 
dependent variable in step 3 is V. Firms with good (poor) governance have a GOV greater than (below) the 
median. High and low levels of Free cash flow, AcquisitionRatio and CapExp are judged relative to their medians. 
The remaining variables are defined in the Table 7. t-statistics are parentheses. ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. Panel A reports step 1 results. Panel B reports step 2 results. 
Panel C reports step 3 results. 












































































Firm-year obs. 19,843 
Adjusted R-sq. 0.06 


































































































































































































Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year obs. 5,014 5,885 5,050 5,849 
Adjusted R-sq. 0.96 0.63 0.91 0.99  
Panel C: Step 3   (Poor or Good Governance; High or Low FCF) 
  Poor Good 
Poor/  
Low Good/ High Low/Good 
High/ 
Poor 































































































































































































































  Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm-year obs. 5,027 5,872 2,561 3,419 2,453 2,466 






Table 15. Robustness – Two-step Heckman Selection Model 
In step 1, using a probit model, we regress Acquisition against Leverage, Firm Size, CapExp/NA, VolCash, LossDummy, 
RD, TAXratio, Cash/NA. We use these results to compute the Inverse Mills Ratio. The step 2 dependent variable is 
V/NA and the independent variables are listed in column 1. Free cash flow is high (low) if its value is above (below) its 
median. Acquisition is high (low) if its value is above (below) its median. We create four categories: high Free cash 
flow low Acquisition; low Free cash flow high Acquisition; both high; both low. Each variable is for firm i at time t 
unless otherwise indicated. Δ indicates the change in a variable from t+1 to t and Δ* indicates the change in a variable 
from t to t-1. The remaining variables are defined in the Table 7. t-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * indicate 






High FCF  
Low Acquisition 
(3) 











































































































































































































Firm-year obs. 11,037 10,212 2,941 2,944 





Chapter 4 Liquidity Beyond the BBO 
 
ABSTRACT 
We investigate the existence and the extent of liquidity beyond the best bid and offer 
(BBO) using Tokyo Security Exchange tick-by-tick daily trading data. We found that 
there is a uniform co-movement liquidity beyond the BBO as measured by strings. 
Strings are a series of trades each of which is at a price that is inferior to or equal to the 
price of the previous trade in the series. The liquidity beyond the BBO is ubiquitously 
invariant across trading days, while remarkably variant across securities. The variations 
of depth and the variations of immediacy needed for the common movement of liquidity 
beyond BBO, however for the first time, are found to be moderate and large respectively 
across trading days. Moreover, the three aspects of liquidity beyond the BBO are 
positively correlated with return volatility of strings. We are the first to show that the 
information content is a significant determinant of the return for trades beyond BBO by 
using the LOB slope, the beginning price, the beginning volume, the beginning spread, 



















Since the shifting from firm-specific liquidity to common determinants of 
liquidity started nearly a decade ago, this line of microstructure research has investigated 
the prevalent traits of trading activities relevant to the market-wide co-movement of 
liquidity (Aitken, et al., 2007; Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Kamara, Lou, & Sadka, 2008) 
in addition to the systematic common movement of liquidity (Amihud, 2002; Chordia, 
Roll, & Subrahmanyam, 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi 2001; Kempf and Mayston, 2008; 
Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008). Among these studies, most majorities focus on the 
commonality in liquidity at or within best bid and offer (BBO). The existence and extent 
beyond the BBO and the aspects of the liquidity beyond the BBO, however, remain 
unexplored.  In addition, it is unknown as to how the LOB status affects the return of the 
trades that walk up/down the LOB.  
We investigate the existence and extent and liquidity beyond the BBO by using 
daily trading data of Tokyo Security Exchange (TSE). Bid and ask spread in various 
forms has been a primary measure of liquidity and liquidity commonality within and 
beyond the BBOs in prior research. In this paper, rather than using conventional various 
spread measures, we employ string which is defined as a series of trades each of which is 
at a price that is inferior to or equal to the price in the series to explore the liquidity of 
orders that walk up/down the limit order book (LOB). In addition, we gauge the 
properties of three aspects of liquidity, i.e., width, depth, and immediacy by examining 
the number of different types of string, the aggregated volume, and the duration measured 




uniform co-movement of liquidity beyond the BBO. The liquidity beyond the BBO is 
ubiquitously invariant across trading days, while remarkably variant across securities. 
The variations of depth and immediacy needed for the common movement of liquidity, 
however for the first time, are found substantially large across trading days. Moreover, all 
three aspects of the liquidity beyond the BBO are found to be positively correlated with 
return volatility of strings. Finally, we show that the state of LOB, i.e., the slope, the 
beginning price, the beginning spread, and the beginning volume, and the duration of 
strings are significant determinants of the return of trades that beyond BBO.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents theoretic 
considerations and development of our empirical hypotheses. In section 3, we provide a 
detailed description of our methodology. Section 4 shows the development of our 
hypotheses. Data and empirical design are described in Section 5. Section 6 reports the 
empirical results. The concluding section contains a summary of findings and the 
implications. 
II. Theoretical Considerations 
 
It is a common knowledge that small trades executed at or within BBO are mostly 
from small order proprietary traders. The available depths at BBO are sufficiently large to 
have these traders’ orders filled due to their relative small demand in size. For large 
trades, normally placed by institutional traders and rich individuals, however, walk 
up/down the LOB by default trading rules when volume is too large to be filled by 
insufficient available depth at BBO. The related frequencies regarding large orders placed 




institutional traders, although not very precise. Prior empirical studies assert that 
institutional traders comprise a significant portion of the trading volume on a number of 
exchanges such as NYSE, London Security Exchange and the Tokyo Security Exchange 
(Chan and Lakonishok, 1993; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Additionally, Chan and 
Lakonishok, 1993; Kamara, Lou, & Sadka, 2008) demonstrate that there is a substantial 
increase in institutional investing and index trading over the years. Therefore, the extent 
of the systematic movement of liquidity beyond the BBO, if any, is non-trivial and 
important. In line with the finding of Kempf and Mayston (2008), we conclude that there 
is a common existence of liquidity beyond the BBO in TSE, which as with NYSE and 
other exchanges being examined in prior studies. Moreover, the liquidity beyond the 
BBO constitutes a substantially large proportion trading activities for institutions traders 
(Hong and Rady, 2002). In addition, we examine and provide for the first time a 
conclusive evidence of little or lack co-variation in two liquidity dimensions: depth and 
immediacy, while in the meantime the third dimension of liquidity: width, co-moves 
across trading days. Lastly, the three dimensions of the liquidity beyond the BBO are 
positively correlated with return volatility of strings. Our study is the first, to the best of 
our knowledge, to show that the information content is a significant determinant of the 
return for trades beyond BBO by using the LOB slope, the beginning price, the beginning 
volume, the beginning spread, and the duration of strings as proxies for the measure of 
the informative-ness in the LOB. 
Using the evidence from Australian Security Exchange, Domowitz, Hansch, and 
Wang (2005) show that there is a linkage between the liquidity commonality and security 




offers. The relationship between the liquidity commonality and return beyond the BBO is 
unknown. In contrast, our focus of liquidity common movement is on the series of trades 
where the volume of large orders is too big to be executed by the best bid or the best offer 
and the remaining unexecuted portion of the order walks up/down the limit order book. 
As a result, as we conjectured, the beginning price, beginning spread, beginning volume 
are significant determinants of the number of trades in the series and the duration of 
strings, thus the return of strings.  
III. Method 
 
We employ a distinct approach which differs from previous empirical studies in 
three ways. First, without access to and relying on price steps of the complete limit order 
book, we are able to test the proposition that there is a co-variation in liquidity beyond 
the BBO as advanced by Kemptf and Mayston (2008). The data that provided to us 
contain no information pertaining order entries such as cancellations, revisions, 
executions, and expirations as the data used in Kemptf and Mayston’s study. The NEEDS 
data of TSE are typical tick-by-tick trading data with anonymous trades and quotes 
records and the associated depths and time stamps precision in minutes.  
Second, the typical liquidity proxy measures such as various types of bid-ask 
spreads are not used as our analytical tool because they are more relevant to the cost of 
demanding for immediacy for small trades. Additionally, liquidity measures of bid-ask 
spread ignore the liquidity demand and supply at multiple steps by disregarding the price 
concession in the later steps for large orders. Thus, the number of price steps of large 




trades. Clearly, the motive and widely usage of bid-ask spread as liquidity measure for 
commonality in liquidity at BBO is due to the fact that permanent component, the 
information contents of the spread can be factored into common market movement. For 
large trades, however, the information contents can be revealed by price premium or 
discount, in our study the price steps, that large buy or sell order traders yield to the 
liquidity suppliers. As a result, this price concession manifested through the willingness 
that the large order traders to trade against standing limit orders with more aggressive 
prices creates a serial consecutive trades that eat up the standing orders in LOB, which 
could not be taken into account by using the bid and ask spread at the BBO. Further, 
similar to the information content embedded in the bid and ask spread, these price steps 
are a proxy for a cost of creating informative prices for large orders. To make these price 
concession steps concrete, we identify trade patterns as described above and characterize 
them into string 2, string 3, …., String 9 based on the number of price concessions and 
form five categories as following:  
1. String 2: a series of trades each of which is at a price that is inferior to or equal to 
the previous price in the series. There are, among these trades, two successively 
higher/lower prices. 
2. String 3: a series of trades each of which is at a price that is inferior to or equal to 
the previous price in the series. There are, among these trades, three successively 
higher/lower prices. 
3. String 4: a series of trades each of which is at a price that is inferior to or equal to 





4. String 5: a series of trades each of which is at a price that is inferior to or equal to 
the previous price in the series. There are, among these trades, five successively   
higher/lower prices. 
5. String “other”: a series of trades (more than five) each of which is at a price that is 
inferior to or equal to the previous price in the series. There are, among these 
trades, a total of five, six, seven, eight, or night successively higher/lower prices. 
Third, in addition to the common movement in liquidity supply beyond the BBO, 
the co-variation of depth and immediacy of liquidity beyond the BBO is investigated, 
which to our knowledge, has received little attention. We show that the variation in three 
dimensions of liquidity i.e. width, depth, and immediacy deviates from each other. Our 
empirical evidence shows that volume that it takes large orders to co-move does not 
necessarily co-vary over time.  Additionally, the immediacy of execution of large orders 
over multiple steps varies significantly through time. These aspects of co-movement of 
liquidity beyond the BBO are relatively new territories in the microstructure literature. 
By exposing these features concerning large orders, we hope that these findings shed 
light on the trading strategies that large order trades could employ to minimize their 
trading costs using appropriate timing and sizes to maximize their returns and minimize 
the risks.  
IV. Hypotheses 
 
In order-driven market, commonality in liquidity at or within BBO arises when 
continuous interactions of both the small order liquidity suppliers and liquidity 




systematic co-movement beyond the BBO. As documented by Aitken et al. (2007) in 
their study of liquidity supply in electronic markets, the institutional investors 
simultaneously and aggressively supply liquidity at multiple price steps in LOB although 
the degree of price aggressiveness varies by institutional investors’ type. That is liquidity 
supply is undoubtedly non-negligible at price steps inferior to BBO. Additionally, Keim 
and Madhavan (1995) state that either due to the fear of high opportunity costs resulting 
from failing to trade timely or because of the belief that their information is short-lived, 
institutional traders show a surprisingly strong demand for immediacy. As a result, 
institutional traders trade aggressively by gradually placing orders inferior to BBO. When 
large order demanders or suppliers price their order aggressively and continuously and 
when this strong immediacy demand and supply is consistently inter-temporal invariant, 
rather than a temporal phenomenon, we are expecting a co-movement of liquidity beyond 
the BBO. Kempf and Mayston (2008) analyze this co-movement using LOB of Xetra of 
Frankfurt Security exchange and unsurprisingly conclude that the commonality in 
liquidity outside of BBO is larger than that of inside BBO. We believe that this 
commonality is not a unique case of Frankfurt Security exchange due to its relative small 
market size, yet it is a distinguishable feature of any rapid-paced market. Accordingly, we 
advance our first hypothesis upon which the consequent hypothesis is built.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a strong evidence of the existence of liquidity beyond the 
BBO across trading days for large orders that walk up/down the LOB. In addition, the 
related aspects of liquidity, i.e. the width, the depth and the immediacy beyond the BBO 




We believe that although there is liquidity beyond the BBO, in particular, a 
common movement in liquidity beyond the BBO. It takes considerably variant volume 
and the immediacy in order executions across the trading days to achieve the co-
movement. Thus, in addition to the width, aspects of liquidity including the size of large 
orders, i.e. depth and how quickly trader’s trading desire is fulfilled, i.e. immediacy do 
not necessary co-vary through time.  
The consumption of available depths of standing limit orders parallels the 
immediacy of the execution of trades in strings. Or, the aggressiveness of price steps and 
the available liquidity supplied jointly determine the immediacy of large order executions. 
Thus, intuitively, immediacy as the third dimension of the liquidity beyond the BBO 
varies by its own across the trading days as set forth by our first hypothesis.  Keim and 
Madhavan (1995) show that large orders spread over a long time period in order to be 
filled i.e., the larger quantities, the longer of trading durations. Based on the unique 
settings of various tick size and different trading units in Tokyo Security Exchange, we 
believe that the duration of strings being executed increases with tick size, MTU, and the 
combination of ticker size and MTU.  That is, more specifically, it takes longer duration 
for large orders walking up/down the LOB for firms that trade at higher tick size, higher 
MTU, or the combination of higher values in ticker size and MTU.  
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Datar et al. (1998) show that liquidity plays a 
significant role in explaining security returns. We conjecture that liquidity beyond the 
BBO positively correlates with the return volatility and hence affects the return of orders 




trades resulting from the most aggressive order what walks up/down the book. By 
definition, the most aggressive order is a “large buy” to buy or a “large sell” to sell a 
larger quantity than that is available at the best bid and offer (Biais, Hillion, & Spatt, 
1995). Secondly, the informative traders and their observers and followers give rise to the 
series of trades in strings by placing a sequence of new orders at or away from the best 
bid and offer. Consequently, given a considerable liquidity supply/demand beyond the 
BBO and significant amount of information contained in the series of trades, we believe 
that the return and the volatility of strings are directly related to the state of the LOB at 
the beginning of strings. The LOB slope, the beginning volume, the beginning price, and 
the beginning spread are our measures of state of the LOB. The beginning volume and 
the beginning price of strings are significant determinants of the return and return 
volatility of strings because both the beginning volume and the beginning price determine 
the price steps that strings contain and determine the duration for the series of trades 
being executed. In addition, we conjecture that the beginning spread of strings which may 
reflect significant amount of private information of strings has significant role in 
determining the returns for large trades. Thus, we develop our second hypothesis as 
following.  
Hypothesis 2: The state of LOB, such as the slope, the beginning price, the 
beginning volume, the beginning spread, and the duration of strings are significant 
determinants of the return and return volatility of strings.  
Thus, we investigate the existence of common movement of liquidity beyond the 




of the LOB at the beginning of strings such as the LOB slope, beginning price, beginning 
spread, beginning volume, and the duration are significant determinants of the return and 
return volatility of strings. In the next section, we present the description of our data and 
the methodology.   
V. Data and Methodology 
Data 
 
The data are obtained from TSE, a purely order-driven market without designated 
market maker or specialist. There are some special features about the TSE that 
differentiate it from other security markets around the world. The TSE includes three 
different security types (sections): first, second and mothers. The first section, also 
referred to as “Blue Chips” is primarily for the largest and successful companies, while 
the second section is mainly for investors interested in smaller firms and trades in lower 
trading volumes relative to the first section. The third, also the mothers, not available 
until November of 1999 trades both domestic and foreign newer and innovative venture 
enterprises. The trading comprises two sessions with standard trading hours starting from 
9am to 11am in the morning session and from 12:30pm to 15:00pm in the afternoon 
session. Consequently, there are two opening and two closing periods. The security price 
formation in these periods is different from that of the regular trading hours. Accordingly, 
there are two distinct methods: Itayose (single price auction method) and Zaraba 
(continuous auction method) to determine security prices. The former is primarily used to 
form the opening and closing prices for each of the trading sessions and the latter is to 




before the closing of the trading sessions. One essential feature of the Zaraba method is 
that it allows large order to walk up the limit order book if the volume is greater than the 
depth available at the best quote. As is the same in most order-driven markets, the price 
takes higher precedence over time in order matching process. However, there are four 
special features pertaining to the TSE market. In contrast to other order-driven markets 
around the world, the TSE allows 11 different tick sizes, specifically 1, 5, 10, 50, 100, 
500, 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, 50,000, and 100,000 Japanese Yen based on various price 
ranges. Second, to protect the investor from the excess volatile price changes, daily price 
limits are set by limiting the maximum range of price fluctuation in accordance to 29 
price ranges. Third, unlike other markets around the world where a variety of types of 
orders are permitted, only two types of order are allowed in TSE market: market order 
and limit order. As a result, there are only two types of trader, who either provides 
immediacy or demands immediacy. All trades are computerized. Lastly, perhaps most 
relevant to our investigation, the trading units can vary. Although trading units can vary 
from 1 share, 10 shares, 50 shares, 100 shares, 500 shares, 1,000 shares to 3,000 shares, 
most majority of domestic securities trade in 1,000 trading unit. These tiered tick sizes 
and trading units, while facilitating the trading activities, are ideal natural breaking points 
in our research design and analyses.  
The sample period is the month June of 2008, which includes a total of 21 trading 
days. In addition to the records of each trade and quote in the normal trading hours, the 
data include pre-opening quotes in the period prior to the opening auction, which is 
specifically from 8:20am till 9:00am for the morning session and from 12:05pm till 




study. For each trade and quote, it includes time stamp, price, and volume as well as best 
bid, best ask, bids and asks inferior to BBO up to 5 cumulative tick sizes, and the 
associated depth. In our sample, the blue-chip securities trading activity accounts for 
nearly 95% of total trading activity, while second section securities trading activity takes 
up about 1.42% and mothers section securities 3.84% of total trading activity,  both of 
which trade in trading unit of 1,000 shares or less. We apply three filters to finalize our 
sample. We limit our analyses to securities that (i) have traded without changing in tick 
size but allowing various trading units, (ii) have at least 15 trades per firm and per trading 
day, and (iii) have continuously traded for 21 days in June, 2008. As a result, there are a 
total of 1,899 distinct securities in our final sample. Of these, 1,608 are “Blue Chips”, 
150 are small securities, and 141 securities are from the mothers market.  
Methodology 
 
In order to measure the common movement of strings, we investigate the co-
variations of the number of strings, of the aggregated volume of strings, and of the 
average duration of strings per trading day across trading days and the co-variations of 
the number of strings, of the aggregated volume, and of the duration of strings per 
security across securities. For the former, the total number of strings, the aggregated 
volume, and the average duration is computed across the securities within one trading day 
regardless of the string types. Similarly, for the latter the number of strings, the 
aggregated volume, and the average duration is totaled for each security across trading 
days with string types disregarded. The variability for each of three aspects of liquidity is 




correlation coefficient in that it deals with observations with same metric (McGraw and 
Wong, 1996). The ICC is a measure of the proportion of a variance that is attributable to 
objects of measurement (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). In this study, the single score ICC for 
two-way random effects model is applied to measure the variations with respect to the 
total number of strings across the trading days and across securities. In the case of 
measuring the variability across trading days, the trading day is regarded as the column 
effect and the firm as the row effect. Both the row and column effects are deemed 
random, i.e. exchangeable. The row and column effects are transposed for the case of 
measuring the variability across securities. Note that ICC can be used to measure either 
consistency or agreement, although the only difference resides computationally in the 
denominator of   in the equation (1). In the case of consistency, it is used to infer the 
inter-rater reliability in most cases. For the purpose of this study, the ICC for degree of 
absolute agreement among measurements as shown in the equation below is used, which 
is formulated based on the mean squares derived from analysis of variance (McGraw and 
Wong, 1996).                                                                                                    
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 (McGraw and Wong, 1996)                 (1) 
Where EMS is the mean square error, CMS is the mean square for columns and 
RMS is the mean square for rows; k denotes the total number of days (the row effect) and 
n is the total number of firms (the column effect). The associated F-test and confidence 
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Where /L obs tabledF F F and *U obs tabledF F F . obsF are the row effects of F from 
two-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). tabledF denotes the (1-0.5a)100th percentile of 
the F distribution with n-1 numerator degrees of freedom and (n-1)(k-1) denominator 
degrees of freedom.  
Next, we use the LOB norm slope as the measure for the degree of 
agreement/disagreement on securities’ valuation among traders. The LOB slope is based 
on the immediate quotes before the first trade in the string and the computation of the 
slope is following Næs and Skjeltorp (2006).  First, we compute the absolute average 
slope for the immediate quotes before the first based on the equations (5) and (6) for ask 
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Where N is the total number of ask prices (tick levels) and τ is the tick level; the subscript 
0 represents the inner quote; thus 0
Ap and 0
Bp denotes the bid-ask midpoint; 1
Ap  and 1
Bp are 
the best ask and best bid respectively. As a result, τ = 0 is the bid-ask midpoint and τ = 1 
represents the best ask or bid quote. For both ask and buy side, the 
ARV is the fraction of 
the total volume at snapshot s at price level τ. 
Av  is the natural logarithm of accumulated 
total volume at each tick level τ. The fraction is computed for each level as the equation 
below by following the appendix of Næs and Skjeltorp (2006).   
/A A ARV V V  

          (7) 
Then we normalize the order book at each snapshot relative to the total number of 
shares supplied in the order book at the snapshot. We average the slope for security i at 
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We identify a sequence of consecutive trades as strings that are a series of trades 
each of which is at a price that is inferior to or equal to the previous price to measure the 
liquidity common movement beyond the BBO. Strings are classified into 5 categories: 
string of 2, 3, 4, 5, and other. A “string 2” has a series of trades each of which is at a price 




two distinct successively higher/lower prices. Similarly, a “string 3” has a series of trades 
each of which is at a price that is inferior to or equal to the previous price in the series, 
among which, there are three distinct successively higher/lower prices. Strings with 
names “strings 4”, “string 5”, and “string other” are formed in the similar fashion. The 
descriptive statistics of strings for both the buy and sell side are delineated in the Table 
15. For string 2 there are five average numbers of consecutive trades and for string 9 
there are an average of 11 numbers of consecutive trades. However, the kurtosis is very 
high and is in an approximately descending order from string 2 to string 9. It indicates 
that the distribution of string 2 has a higher peakiness or is more heavily tailed relative to 
strings of higher number. Or simply put, more of the variance is due to infrequent 
extreme deviations for string 2 than other types of strings. 
The frequencies of strings, average duration of strings, and LOB slopes are 
presented in Table 16 for both buy and sell sides. The buy side has slightly lower 
frequencies for strings with length greater than 2 than its sell side counterparts, while the 
buy side has higher frequencies relative to that of the sell side except for strings 2. 
Overall, strings compose a little over 14% of all trades on both the buy side and the sell 
side with most majorities in string 2. Moreover, for both buy and sell side, the general 
trend is that the proportion decreases when the number of the trades in the string series 
increases. Moreover, strings with more than 5 trades make up about only 0.10% on both 
sides. We report the average and the standard deviation of the duration in columns (3) 
and (4) for buy and sell side respectively. The durations of strings are computed by taking 
the difference of the minutes between the first trade and the last trade within the string. 




strings. As seen in the Table 16, the duration is longer for the sell side than the buy side 
market. It seems that the more trades in the string series there are, the more minutes are 
needed for the completion of the entire strings series. This is opposite to the order in the 
frequencies of strings, i.e. the more trades in the string, the less proportion in the whole 
sample. Additionally, string 5 takes the longest duration to complete among all types of 
string. The descriptive statistics of slope is reported in column (5).  It appears that the 
lower number of trades in the string, the more gentle the slopes are. In other words, the 
aggressive traders complete their orders in small number of trades when there is a widely 
dispersed belief on securities’ valuation among investors.  
In Table 17, descriptive statistics by tick size and MTU combinations are 
presented for the frequencies of strings, the average duration of strings, and average 
aggregated volume of strings by string types. For the same combination of the tick size 
and the MTU, strings with more trades in the series are associated with longer duration, 
the same general trend observed in the Table 16. Moreover, across different string types, 
the average duration of strings and the average aggregated volume of strings generally 
increase with the MTU regardless of the tick size. Lastly, it is generally true that for the 




If there is a common movement in liquidity beyond the BBO, as we conjectured, 
there will be little variation in liquidity measure, in our case, the number of strings over 




trading days and across securities by combinations of tick size and MTU. The ICC is 
viewed as the proportion of relevant variance that is associated with differences among 
measured objects or persons. The closer to the unity the ICC is the smaller degree of 
variability it represents. Conversely, it shows a strong variability if ICC approaches zero. 
Panel A of Table 18 reports the ICC for the number of strings across trading days. The 
ICCs are significant at 99% confidence level in nearly all cases. Consistent with our 
expectation, ICCs are of large size or close to the unit and are indicative of small degree 
or lack of variation in the number of strings across the trading days. Clearly, there is a 
pervasively strong co-movement of liquidity beyond the BBO, confirming our first 
hypothesis. In contrast, the panel B, reporting the ICCs across securities, reveals a 
pronouncedly strong degree of variation. The less degree or absent of co-movement in 
liquidity across securities is not abnormal as firms inherently differ. Note that similar 
sized ICCs across different combinations of the tick size and the MTU in panel A and 
panel B respectively are indicative of little cross-sectional variation in the intensity of 
liquidity beyond the BBO. 
Given strongly significant evidence of common movement of liquidity, broader 
questions related to liquidity are asked. Do other aspects of liquidity exhibit same level of 
variation? Does it take similar length of time to complete the string 2 to that of string 
“other”? Does it consume similar amount of volume for the completion of different string 
types or it varies? Liquidity is commonly known to have at least three dimensions: width, 
depth, and immediacy. As with width, we proceed to examine the variation over depth 
and immediacy across trading days and across securities. The depth is measured by the 




within the string are executed and is measured in minutes, which is termed as the duration 
of strings in our study. The empirical results are displayed in columns 8 through 11 for 
trading volume and columns 12 through 15 for duration accordingly. For aggregated 
trading volume, the variability across trading days is considerably stronger relative to that 
of the number of strings, supportive of our first hypothesis. Moreover, the ICCs are in 
within a wider range: 0.1 to 0.8 than the ICCs for the number of strings: 0.4 to 0.9, 
indicating there is a considerably large variation in the aggregated volume by various 
combinations of the tick size and the MTU. Further, no evidence of strong variation 
across securities is detected. To test the first hypothesis, similarly, we compute and report 
the ICCs by duration across trading days and across securities.  Our evidence provides 
strong support for the hypothesis 1. The ICCs reported are in a range less than that of 
number of strings, suggesting a high level degree of variation in the durations of the 
completion of the series of trades in strings across trading days. Most majority ICCs are 
significant at the 0.01 level in panel A.   
The variation across securities is mostly insignificant as shown in Panel B, similar 
to the results of the aggregated volume of strings. The higher degree of variation in 
duration of strings in Panel B as represented by smaller values in ICCs relative to that of 
in Panel A for the number of strings and the aggregated trading volume of strings is 
consistent with the univariate results illustrated in Table 16 and Table 17 respectively.  
In Table 19, we report the correlation between the return volatility of strings 
(squared returns) and the aspects of the liquidity beyond the BBO. As can be seen in both 




positively associated with all aspects of liquidity beyond the BBO. More specifically, 
there is a higher risk in the return of strings when there is higher number of price 
concession steps in the strings, when higher volume is demanded, and when longer 
duration is required to complete the series of trades in the string. Notably, the aspects of 
the liquidity beyond the BBO are positively correlated with each other at 0.01alpha level.   
Indeed, the information content of large orders that can significantly affect the 
return of for large orders. How does the informativeness resided in the LOB affect the 
return and volatility of strings? We probe into this question by first examining the 
information content of strings using the beginning spread, the beginning price, the 
beginning volume of the first trade in the series as well as the duration of strings. We 
investigate their relation by regressing the return and return volatility of strings on the 
beginning price, the beginning volume, the beginning spread, and the duration of strings 
(measured in minutes). We also include 4 dummy coded variables in the regression 
representing string types from 2 to 5 by treating strings that have at least 6 trades in the 
series as the reference group. As revealed in Panel A of Table 20, for buy side market, the 
higher beginning price is associated with the lower return of strings, because for buyers 
the buying price is one of the key determinants of their goal of maximizing returns. On 
the contrary, the beginning price is positively related to the return of strings for the sell 
side market, i.e., the higher selling price to start with, the higher return of strings for 
sellers. The beginning spread, however, has completely opposite direction with the return 
of strings to that of the relationship between the beginning price and the return of strings. 
For the buy side, higher return of strings is significantly associated with wider beginning 




words, the less information content in the beginning spread (Easley and O'Hara, 1987), 
the buyers have higher return. This is consistent with Hasbrouck’s (1991) finding that 
wide spreads have larger price impacts. Both the volume and the duration of strings seem 
to be positively related with the return of strings for the buy side market and negatively 
related with the return of the strings for the sell sides of the markets. On the other hand, 
for the buy side market, strings that have more number of trades in the series have higher 
returns compared to strings have less number of trades in the series. This is the consistent 
with the effect of duration on string return. The effect is reversed for the sell side market. 
Collectively, the evidence shows that the return is higher when the traders sell the series 
of the trades more quickly and in a smaller number of trades.  
The results for return volatility of the strings are displayed in the Panel B of Table 
20. The directions of the control variable are consistent for both the buy and sell side 
market. In summary, the return volatility of strings is inversely related to the beginning 
price and beginning volume, however positively related to the beginning spread and the 
duration of the strings. In addition, the negative coefficients for string dummy variable 
indicate that strings with more than 6 trades in the series are more risky than other string 
types. Intuitively, it is because the longer the duration or the more trades in the strings 
incurs higher uncertainty of the price concessions and price steps.  
Second, we use the slope of the beginning quote of strings as a proxy for 
informative-ness in the LOB. A gentle slope represents a wide dispersed belief of traders 
in security’s valuation (Næs and Skjeltorp, 2006). Thus, it is believed that when traders 




uncertainty of the value of the security, the slope of the LOB is more gentle than the 
slope when there is a homogeneous belief among traders. We report our results in the 
Table 21. As shown in columns (1) and (2), return is higher when slope is steeper, while 
return volatility increases as slope is more gentle, consistent with the findings of Næs and 
Skjeltorp (2006). We include the interaction term of slope and string in the regression to 
investigate the mediation effect of slope by string types and report the results in columns 
(3) and (4). Clearly, the linear line of return of strings by the number of trades in the 
series is steeper if the LOB slope increases one unit. That is the slope of the return on the 
number of trades increases as heterogeneous belief in securities valuation increases. 
Conversely, the slope of the return volatility on the number of trades decreases as 
heterogeneous belief in securities valuation increases. In columns (5) and column (6), we 
report the similar regression results by including interaction of slope by string dummy 
variables. The variables of interests are the interaction terms and the LOB slope. For 
instance, the interaction term slope*string 2 represents the return for the string 2 while 
the slope represents the return for the reference group, the string with more than 6 trades 
in the series. All the interaction terms are negative in the return regression and positive in 
the volatility of return regression. Thus, we conclude that the wider dispersed belief in 
traders’ valuation on the securities the higher return for strings with more than 6 trades in 
the series relative to strings with fewer than 6 trades in the series. That is, for block trades 
that walk up/down the book, the return is higher when less private information in the 
order flow. This result is in line with the results for trades within the BBO. As can be 




VII. Summary and Conclusions 
 
By the end of 2008, according to the report of World Federation of Exchanges, 
the TSE ranked the second in terms of market capitalization around the world. Its fast-
paced trading activities make our results applicable to most major exchanges and markets 
around the world. Using tick-by-tick trading data of the TSE in June of 2008, we first 
examine the existence and extent of liquidity beyond the BBO by identifying strings 
which by definition are a series of trades each of which is at a price that is greater than or 
equal to the previous price in the series. We are able to capture the co-variation of 
liquidity beyond the BBO without relying on the complete LOB. We show that ICC that 
is the measure of variability among the number of strings is prevalently close to unity 
across various combinations of tick size and MTU. As a result, we conclude that there is 
a systematic co-movement in liquidity beyond the BBO. In addition to the empirical 
evidences of common liquidity or common movement of strings beyond the BBO, we 
also examine the degrees of the co-variation of the depth and immediacy, the other two 
properties of liquidity beyond the BBO. We show that co-variation of the duration of 
strings, in contrast to that of the number of strings is relatively high and to a lesser degree 
the co-variation of the depth is moderate across trading days. Therefore, we conclude that 
there is extensive liquidity beyond the BBO, however, the related aspects of liquidity, i.e. 
the width, the depth and the immediacy beyond the BBOs have various variability across 
trading days. 
Not surprisingly, each of three properties of liquidity beyond the BBO is 




analysis shows that the return of strings and return volatility of strings have direct 
relationship with the beginning prices, the beginning spread, the beginning volume, and 
the duration of strings. Specifically, the beginning spread, the beginning volume, and the 
duration of the strings has a positive relationship with the return of strings for buy side 
and an inverse relationship with the return of strings for sell side. On the contrary, the 
higher beginning price reduces the return of strings for the buy side while improves the 
return of strings for the sell side. The return volatility increases as the number of trades in 
the string series increases and when the beginning price decreases. Moreover, the return 
volatility is higher when the beginning spread is wider and the duration is longer. We also 
examine the effect of the slope on the return and return volatility of the strings. We 
conclude that when traders have heterogeneous belief in securities’ valuation, it increases 
return and decreases the volatility of the string return for strings with more than 6 trades 
in the series relative to strings with less than 6 trades in the series.  Slope by itself is 
negatively related to the return volatility and positive related to the return, which is 
consistent with the prior research.  
Thus, we find conclusive evidence in supporting of our hypothesis that the 
information significant affect block trades’ return and volatility by using the LOB slope 
and the state of the LOB as our proxies for the measure of the informative-ness in the 
LOB. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show that the private information 
has significant impact on the return of the block trades that walk up/down the LOB, 
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Table 16. Descriptive Statistics of Number of Trades in the Strings 
We define the string based on number of price concession steps. For example, string 2 is 
a series of trades each of which is at a price that is inferior to or equal to the previous 
price in the series. There are, among these trades, two successively higher/lower prices. 
Similarly, string 3 is a series of trades each of which is at a price that is inferior to or 
equal to the previous price in the series and there are, among these trades, three 
successively higher/lower prices. Similarly, string 9 is a series of trades each of which is 
at a price that is inferior to or equal to the previous price in the series. There are, among 
these trades, a total of night successively higher/lower prices. 
  
  
 Buy side Sell side 
Mean STD Skewnes
s 
Kurtosis Mean STD Skewnes
s 
Kurtosis 
String 2 5.16 6.37 19.92 1048.1 4.95 5.59 19.18 966.4 
String 3 6.08 5.40 12.12 322.3 5.85 5.30 25.67 1729.5 
String 4 7.00 4.86 10.72 219.8 6.90 4.82 11.00 216.3 
String 5 7.93 4.36 8.35 126.1 7.88 5.56 20.79 819.1 
String 6 8.81 3.94 7.79 111.5 8.83 4.17 7.68 99.61 
String 7 9.88 5.10 18.22 614.2 9.81 5.28 12.79 250.7 
String 8 10.65 3.65 8.85 149.2 10.47 2.77 4.24 29.84 




Table 17. Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics of Number of Strings and Duration 
of Strings 
Strings are classified into 5 different types depending on the number trades at 
successively higher/lower prices in the series. For example, string 2 is a series of trades 
each of which is at a price that is inferior to or equal to the previous price in the series 
and there are two trades, among the series of trades, at successively higher/lower prices. 
The “other” category includes strings of a series of 6, 7, 8, or 9 such trades. The 
LOBslope is the LOB slope computed using the immediate quotes before the first trade in 
the series. The frequency and the percentage (in parenthesis) are reported in the columns 
(1) and (2) for buy and sell sides respectively. The average duration of strings (in minutes) 
and the standard deviation (in parenthesis) are reported in the columns (4) and (5) for buy 
and sell sides respectively. Column (5) reports the average and standard deviation of the 
LOB slope.  
String Type Frequency of strings 
(%) 
Average duration of strings 
 (SD) 
LOBSlope 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Buy Sell Buy Sell All  









































































Frequencies of Strings Average Duration of Strings  
(SD) 
Average Aggregated Volume 
(SD) 
Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell 
 Panel A - Combination of Tick Size and MTU for String of Length 2 
1 1 2 2,071 2,188 0.25 (0.47) 0.24 (0.49) 88 (311) 99 (211) 
1 10 2 1,221 2,642 0.43 (1.05) 0.43 (0.92) 521 (847) 735 (4347) 
1 50 2 4,048 5,507 0.34 (0.89) 0.40 (0.96) 2318 (3216)  2338 (5981) 
1 100 2 122,605 197,789 0.62 (1.56) 0.76 (1.75) 4980 (24149)  3791 (17245) 








5 50 2 196 411 1.30 (1.79) 1.82 (2.61) 403 (428)  490 (487) 
5 100 2 18,755 28,495 1.04 (1.95) 1.23 (2.11) 3881 (9064)  3471 (7382) 




10 1 2 5,781 6,493 0.56 (1.52) 0.61 (1.54) 22 (52) 25 (88) 
10 10 2 10,761  11,014 0.43 (0.87) 0.53 (1.06) 785 (1903) 714 (2443) 
10 50 2 2,187 2,319 0.60 (1.31) 0.89 (1.76) 1837 (2456) 1615 (2986 
10 100 2 29,644 47,403 0.84 (1.73) 0.98 (1.84) 5313 (42587) 5534 (28292) 
10 500 2 132 268 1.93 (3.14) 2.80 (4.49) 6436 (7537) 21773 
(256702) 




50 1 2 2,632 4,192 0.38 (0.90) 0.42 (1.17) 102 (238)  133 (271) 
50 10 2 48 137 3.40 (5.02) 3.65 (5.03) 31 (16)  32 (18) 
100 1 2 5,208 6,130 0.72 (1.60) 0.85 (1.98) 17 (21)  16 (23) 
1000 1 2 23,454 25,680 0.84 (2.06) 0.98 (2.23) 61 (238) 54 (187) 
10000 1 2 80 109 1.92 (3.33) 1.91 (3.17) 210 (267) 1.91 (3.17) 
 Panel B - Combination of Tick Size and MTU for String of Length 3 
1 1 3 473 575 0.40 (0.55) 0.36 (0.58) 174 (281) 210 (328) 
1 10 3 246 661 0.51 (0.94) 0.64 (1.39) 1036 (1164)  1216 (1451) 
1 50 3 972 1,376 0.48 (1.10) 0.60 (1.30) 4329 (4971)  4301 (5159) 
1 100 3 27,219 45,728 1.05 (2.15) 1.21 (2.34) 6194 (26850)  5145 (18649) 








5 50 3 32 52 1.50 (1.57) 1.83 (2.03) 942 (574) 862 (592) 
5 100 3 1,843 2,714 1.71 (3.08) 1.95 (2.94) 5175 (13096) 5075 (9336) 




10 1 3 1,646 1,872 0.82 (1.88) 0.78 (1.90) 38 (58)  41 (59) 
10 10 3 2,015 1,982 0.47 (0.77) 0.67 (1.10) 1155 (2254) 949 (1650) 
10 50 3 272 252 0.77 (1.38) 1.41 (2.68) 4720 (4540) 3951 (3647) 
10 100 3 3,033 4,686 1.32 (2.30) 1.52 (2.63) 4570 (8168) 5884 (62617) 
10 500 3 12 9 2.33 (2.87) 4.22 (3.67) 10375 (6169) 10944 (5276) 




50 1 3 499 673 0.77 (1.50) 0.82 (1.56) 167 (326) 134 (301) 
50 10 3 9 37 4.33 (4.95) 5.16 (5.62) 50 (13) 69 (41) 
100 1 3 922 1,210 1.09 (2.44) 1.41 (3.11) 40 (42)  31 (44) 
1000 1 3 2,800 2,807 1.22 (2.31) 1.34 (3.08) 47 (182)  54 (190) 
 Panel C - Combination of Tick Size and MTU for String of Length 4 
1 1 4 138 194 0.43 (0.61) 0.44 (0.65) 222 (228)  337 (414) 
1 10 4 101 203 0.60 (1.19) 0.45 (0.64) 1778 (2856)  1899 (2318) 






1 100 4 8,171 13,787 1.34 (2.58) 1.51 (2.52) 8196 (31020)  7470 (68836) 












Table 17. Descriptive Statistics of Duration of Strings and Aggregated Volume by 








Frequencies of Strings Average Duration of Strings  
(SD) 
Average Aggregated Volume 
(SD) 
Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell 
5 100 4 336 521 1.93 (2.57) 2.46 (3.63) 6400 (12256) 6098 (18488) 
5 1000 4 65 76 1.20 (1.62) 1.72 (2.22) 66154 (70372) 50237 (54794) 
10 1 4 546 661 0.89 (1.68) 1.10 (2.85) 55 (75)  67 (96) 
10 10 4 600 630 0.59 (0.76) 0.83 (1.32) 1274 (1848)  1391 (2335) 
10 50 4 51 51 1.37 (2.42) 1.27 (1.47) 6079 (7948)  6288 (4485) 
10 100 4 625 1,020 1.54 (2.57) 1.78 (2.83) 5128 (10705)  5339 (9150) 
10 500 4 2 3 2.00 (1.41) 5.67 (5.69) 20250 (4596)  10000 (1500) 
10 1000 4 4 1 2.00 (1.41) Na 54750 (71369)  97667 (49541) 
50 1 4 118 155 0.66 (1.36) 1.05 (1.85) 211 (580)  185 (448) 
50 10 4 4 10 5.50 (10.34) 7.70 (14.02) 43 (29) 81 (21) 
100 1 4 280 312 1.27 (2.77) 1.49 (2.63) 65 (75)  49 (94) 
1000 1 4 744 624 1.38 (2.63) 1.54 (3.15) 48 (143)  54 (173) 
Panel D- Combination of Tick Size and MTU for String of Length 5 
1 1 5 67 102 0.51 (0.61) 0.44 (0.65) 419 (417)  495 (530) 
1 10 5 29 96 0.38 (0.56) 0.69 (1.27) 2825 (3016)  3314 (4351) 
1 50 5 120  171 0.57 (0.92) 0.91 (1.56) 9623 (10593)  8440 (8280) 
1 100 5 2,689 4,518 1.52 (2.86) 1.78 (2.87) 9876 (35669)  8596 (21845) 
1 500 5 54 117 1.72 (2.66) 2.07 (2.65) 34926 (67161)  52611 
(305814) 
1 1000 5 1,668 2,937 2.04 (3.18) 2.31 (3.64) 33260 (59812) 36797 (154110) 
5 100 5 78 124 2.82 (5.09) 2.72 (4.72) 5685 (7046) 7389 (13066) 
5 1000 5 10 14 1.70 (2.06) 1.50 (2.35) 33400 (35994) 65571 (74728) 
10 1 5 176 241 1.36 (2.14) 0.99 (1.47) 82 (200) 87 (98) 
10 10 5 222 204 0.72 (1.07) 0.78 (1.01) 1719 (2171) 1375 (1165) 
10 50 5 12 10 0.75 (0.75) 1.20 (1.40) 5521 (3651) 5960 (4579) 
10 100 5 137 263 1.37 (2.08) 2.02 (3.25) 6482 (10395) 4665 (7405) 
50 1 5 43 57 0.63 (0.79) 0.58 (0.82) 208 (449) 537 (1607) 
50 10 5 2 3 1.50 (2.12) 2.33 (4.04) 100 (14) 167 (119) 
100 1 5 82 110 1.71 (4.25) 1.50 (2.88) 82 (81)  76 (73) 
1000 1 5 206 193 1.86 (2.78) 1.10 (1.70) 25 (36) 76 (392) 
Panel E - Combination of Tick Size and MTU for String of Length Other 
1 1 Other 90 104 0.34 (0.52) 0.28 (0.49) 323 (526)  404 (537) 
1 10 Other 43 89 0.35 (0.53) 0.44 (0.54) 1836 (2384) 2737 (3216) 
1 50 Other 67 138 0.42 (0.70) 0.64 (1.16) 9996 (14468)  9624 (11311) 
1 100 Other 1,563 2,891 1.30 (2.50) 1.66 (2.97) 11290 (28520) 9198 (23914) 
1 500 Other 30 50 1.30 (1.91) 1.86 (2.35) 23633 (33127)  25130 (28711) 
1 1000 Other 911 1,700 1.82 (3.46) 2.06 (3.49) 35527 (56433)  36941 (74811) 
5 100 Other 26 56 1.62 (2.47) 2.98 (3.80) 5238 (7963) 6379 (9544) 
5 1000 Other 1 6 4.00 (Na) 1.83 (1.17) 11000 (Na) 52500 (34274) 
10 1 Other 160 212 1.48 (4.91) 0.96 (1.58) 85 (105)  108 (156) 
10 10 Other 151 142  0.57 (0.81) 0.64 (0.96) 1657 (2702) 1465 (1618) 
10 50 Other 6 4 0.83 (0.41) 0.50 (0.58) 12350 (9689) 8463 (5271) 
10 100 Other 76 111 1.83 (2.12) 2.21 (4.90) 4784 (5069) 3999 (9272) 
50 1 Other 23 46 1.13 (2.67) 0.54 (1.17) 364 (842)  182 (412) 
100 1 Other 64 65 1.14 (2.96) 1.37 (3.00) 100 (156)  70 (104) 




Table 19. Intra-class Correlation Coefficients 
For the 21 trading days in June 2008, for each tick size MTU combination, for buys and sells, in turn, we report intra-class 
correlation coefficients (ICCs) and the associated F-value across days (Panel A) and across securities (Panel B). We report 
ICCs for number of strings in columns 3-6, for trading volume in columns 7-10, and for duration in columns 11-14. An ICC 
close to zero (one) indicates high (low) variability. We report the number of observations in column 15. * and † indicate that 
we reject the null hypothesis of equality of number of strings at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.  
Panel A- ICC across Trading Days 
   Number of Strings Trading volume Duration 
Tick 
Size 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)  
1 10 21 0.838* 119 0.875* 164 0.224* 7.44 0.258* 8.59 0.601* 30.6 0.382* 14.5 
1 50 21 0.788* 81 0.719* 62.8 0.340† 11.8 0.319* 12.1 0.653* 39.7 0.714* 54.9 
1 100 21 0.910* 222 0.862* 141 0.787* 78.9 0.384* 113 0.333* 11.8 0.403* 15.5 
1 500 21 0.420* 19.0 0.710* 61.3 0.244* 8.31 0.296* 10.1 0.444* 19.2 0.533* 25.4 
1 1000 21 0.808* 95.4 0.797* 90.1 0.589† 31.7 0.647* 40.1 0.385* 14.7 0.435* 17.5 
5 100 21 0.826* 111 0.697* 52.8 0.572* 30.7 0.668* 44.7 0.392* 15.3 0.430* 17.3 
5 1000 21 0.922* 284 0.779* 90.1 0.775* 80.6 0.591* 33.1 0.416* 16.3 0.538* 24.9 
10 1 21 0.745* 66.1 0.670* 48.8 0.695* 48.9 0.553* 27.3 0.188* 5.8 0.370* 13.4 
10 10 21 0.889* 183 0.825* 110 0.664* 44.7 0.654* 43.6 0.331* 12.7 0.452* 17.9 
10 50 21 0.924* 225 0.870* 125 0.787* 76.7 0.794* 81.9 0.507* 22.9 0.646* 42.1 
10 100 21 0.786* 83.9 0.826* 110 0.456* 18.7 0.684* 47.7 0.505* 22.8 0.483* 20.9 
10 1000 21 0.445* 25.4 0.627* 39.0 0.130 4.12 0.201† 5.69 0.142 4.02 0.388* 13.6 
50 1 21 0.849* 132 0.916* 230 0.688* 46.8 0.905* 206 0.528* 24.3 0.636* 35.2 
100 1 21 0.724* 62.5 0.744* 64.9 0.534* 26.1 0.595* 33.0 0.369* 13.6 0.392* 14.2 
1000 1 21 0.866* 146 0.877* 166 0.720* 56.1 0.826* 102 0.479* 21.2 0.430* 16.9 
10000 1 21 0.539* 26.7 -0.024 0.38 0.149† 5.49 0.165† 5.56 -0.029 0.44 0.001 1.02 
Panel B - ICC across Securities 
   Number of Strings Trading volume Duration 
Tick 
Size 












1 10 2 0.013 1.18 0.012 1.22 0.047 1.13 0.030 1.08 -0.027 0.87 0.021 1.07 
1 50 4 0.016 1.42 0.040† 1.87 0.015 1.10 0.067 1.50 -0.083 0.57 -0.039 0.69 
1 100 294 0.001* 8.26 0.003* 7.89 0.000 0.078 0.000 1.08 0.020* 9.53 0.022* 13.1 




1 1000 435 0.004* 10.3 0.007* 14.7 0.000 0.888 0.002* 2.53 0.059* 330 0.007* 6.44 
5 100 61 0.004† 2.92 0.019* 5.25 0.017* 3.38 0.007* 2.42 0.023* 3.47 0.008† 1.99
5 1000 10 0.010* 2.57 0.037* 3.02 0.021† 2.13 0.021 1.55 0.011 1.21 -0.012 0.75 
10 1 14 0.004 1.23 0.030* 2.54 -0.014 0.369 -0.002 0.94 0.015 1.32 0.025 1.51 
10 10 11 0.008† 1.87 0.016† 2.04 0.017 1.59 0.024† 1.76 0.075* 2.38 -0.014 0.76 
10 50 3 -0.010 0.648 -0.018 0.63 -0.006 0.922 0.003 1.05 0.008 1.05 0.024 1.22 
10 100 84 0.173* 8.26 0.014* 8.77 0.000 1.03 0.008* 3.05 0.014* 3.39 0.003† 1.41 
10 1000 2 0.227 1.91 0.026 1.15 -0.006 0.987 -0.102 0.77 -0.131 0.74 -0.036 0.89 
50 1 4 0.007 1.27 0.000 1.02 -0.002 0.977 0.002 1.10 -0.013 0.90 -0.026 0.73 
100 1 11 0.022† 2.25 0.011 1.51 0.028 1.81 0.014 1.40 0.040 1.69 -0.014 0.76 
1000 1 57 0.037* 16.3 0.011* 6.52 -0.003 0.006 0.003† 1.80 0.066* 6.85 0.002† 1.19 






Table 20. Correlations Results 
 
This table reports correlations between the liquidity aspects of strings and squared return 
(a measure of return volatility). Panel A (B) presents the Pearson correlation results for 
buy (sell) side. * and † indicate that we reject the null hypothesis of equality of number of 
strings at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 Return Volatility  String Length Aggregated Volume 
Duration of strings 
(in Minutes) 
Panel A: Buy Side 
Return Volatility 
1    
String Length 
0.022* 1   
Aggregated Volume 
0.020* 0.033* 1  
Duration of strings (in 
Minutes) 
0.035* 0.060* 0.051* 1 
Panel B: Sell Side 
Return Volatility 
1    
String Length 
0.019* 1   
Aggregated Volume 
0.016* 0.034* 1  
Duration of strings (in 
Minutes) 






Table 21. Regression Outcomes 
This table reports regression outcomes for both buy side and sell side using string return 
and string return volatility as dependent variable in Panel A and panel B respectively. 
The beginning price, beginning volume, and beginning spread are the price, volume, and 
spread of the initial trade of the string. The duration of strings is the minutes consumed to 
complete the series of trades in the string. The t-statistics are bracketed and computed 
using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. * and † indicate that we reject the null 





Panel A:  String Return   Panel B: String Return Volatility 









































































No of observation 203,765 346,597 203,765 346,597 




Table 22. Effect of LOB Slope on String Return and String Return Volatility 
This table reports regression outcomes using string returns as dependent variable. The LOBslope is the 
LOB slope computed using the immediate quotes before the first trade in the series. The beginning price, 
beginning volume, beginning spread are the respective price, volume, and spread of the initial trade of the 
string. The string with at least 6 trades in the series is treated as the reference group for the string dummy 
variables. The t-statistics are bracketed and computed using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. * 




                                         
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 























































































No of observation 1,198,070 1,198,070 1,198,070 1,198,070 1,198,070 1,198,070 
Adj. R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
